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6.1  Introduction 
In the face of uncertainty about the true structure of  the economy, policy- 
makers may disagree about the macroeconomic effects of monetary policy and 
thus about the appropriate policy setting. One approach to resolving this prob- 
lem is to search for monetary policy rules that work well across a wide range 
of  structural models, that is, rules that are robust to model uncertainty.’ In this 
paper, we investigate the characteristics of policy rules that yield low output 
and inflation volatility across four different structural macroeconometric mod- 
els of the U.S. economy: the Federal Reserve Board staff model (cf. Brayton, 
Levin, et al. 1997), the Monetary Studies Research model of Orphanides and 
Wieland (1998);  the Fuhrer-Moore (1995) model, and Taylor’s (1993b) multi- 
country model-henceforth  referred to as the FRB, MSR, and FM models and 
Andrew Levin, Volker Wieland, and John C. Williams are economists at the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System. 
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the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or the views of any other members of 
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1. We use the term “model uncertainty” to refer to lack of knowledge about which model among 
a given set of alternatives provides the best description of the economy. For a particular model, we 
treat the estimated parameters as known with certainty. A small literature exists on the problem of 
conducting monetary policy under model uncertainty (Karakitsos and Rustem 1984; Becker et al. 
1986; Frankel and Rockett 1988; Holtham and Hughes-Hallett  1992; Christodoulakis, Kemball- 
Cook, and Levine 1993). Optimal policy under parameter uncertainty was investigated in the semi- 
nal paper of Brainard (1967) and was extended by  the work of Kendrick (1982) and others; the 
more recent literature includes Balvers and Cosimano (1994) and Wieland (1996a, 1998). 
2. MSR is a small macroeconometric model of the U.S.  economy from 1980 to 1996,  developed 
and used for research on monetary policy rules in the Monetary Studies Section at the Federal 
Reserve Board (e.g., Orphanides et al. 1997). 
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TMCM, respectively. All four models incorporate the assumptions of rational 
expectations, short-run nominal inertia, and long-run monetary neutrality but 
differ in many other respects (e.g., the dynamics of  prices and real expendi- 
tures). We  compute the inflation-output volatility frontier of  each model for 
alternative specifications of the interest rate rule, subject to an upper bound on 
nominal interest rate volatility. We  then evaluate robustness to model uncer- 
tainty by taking the rules that perfom well in one model and measuring their 
performance in each of the other three models. 
Our analysis provides strong support for rules in which the first difference 
of  the federal funds rate responds to the current output gap and the deviation 
of the one-year average inflation rate from a specified target. First, in all four 
models, first-difference rules perform much better than rules of the type con- 
sidered by  Taylor (1993a) and Henderson and McKibbin (1993), in which the 
level of the federal funds rate responds to the output gap and inflation deviation 
from target. Second, more complicated rules (i.e., rules that respond to a larger 
number of  variables, or additional lags of the output gap and inflation, or both) 
typically generate very small gains in stabilizing output and inflation compared 
with optimal first-difference rules. A closely related result is that rules involv- 
ing model-based forecasts generally do not outperform first-difference rules 
based on the current output gap and inflation rate and quite often generate 
higher variability of output and inflation. Finally, the class of first-difference 
rules is robust to model uncertainty in the sense that a first-difference rule 
taken from the policy frontier of one model is very close to the policy frontier 
of each of  the other three models. In contrast, we find that more complicated 
rules are somewhat less robust to model uncertainty: rules with a larger num- 
ber of free parameters can be fine-tuned to the dynamics of a specific model 
but often perform poorly in other models compared with the best simple rules. 
The approach of evaluating policy rules used in this paper follows the long 
and distinguished tradition dating to Phillips (1  954).3 As is standard in this 
literature, we assume the objective of policy is to minimize the weighted sum 
of  the unconditional variances of  the inflation rate and the output gap (the 
percentage deviation of  GDP from its potential level). In addition, we allow 
interest rate volatility to enter into the policymakers’ optimization problem. 
The funds rate is set according to a time-invariant policy rule. For a given class 
of policy rules, the policy frontier traces out the best obtainable outcomes in 
terms of inflation, output, and funds rate volatility. We refer to the policy rules 
underlying such a frontier as “optimal” in the sense that these rules represent 
solutions to the specified constrained optimization problem. 
3. The literature on policy evaluation using traditional structural models is large and includes 
important contributions by Cooper and Fischer (1974) and Poole (1970). In recent papers, Fair 
and Howrey (1996), Ball (1997), and Rudebusch and Svensson (chap. 5 of this volume) derive 
optimal policies from traditional structural macroeconomic models. For a general survey of  the 
recent literature on monetary policy and analysis of some key issues in a unified framework, see 
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One major difference between our analysis and much of that in the previous 
literature is that we compute optimal policy frontiers using large rational ex- 
pectations macroeconomic models-including  models with more than  100 
equations-as  opposed to traditional structural  models or small rational expec- 
tations  model^.^ Policy rule analysis using traditional models is particularly 
prone to the Lucas critique (Lucas 1976).  Fischer (1977) and Phelps and Taylor 
(1977) made strides in overcoming the inconsistency between policy and ex- 
pectations inherent in traditional models by using small rational expectations 
structural models for policy analy~is.~  In the past, policy rule analysis using 
rational expectations models was hampered by the computational  cost of solv- 
ing and computing moments of  models with more than a small number of 
equations. Analysis was generally limited to the comparison of  a small set of 
policy regimes as in Bryant et al. (1989, 1993) and Taylor (1993b). Increases 
in computer speed and the development of  efficient solution algorithms have 
made the computation of optimal frontiers of large linear rational expectations 
models feasible. 
We present the policy frontiers in inflation-output volatility space, with each 
curve corresponding to a particular constraint on the volatility of the first dif- 
ference of the funds rate. Interest rate volatility plays a key role in our analysis. 
All four models share the feature of a trade-off between interest rate volatility 
and inflation-output volatility, even at levels of interest rate volatility signifi- 
cantly above those implied by  estimated policy rules or observed in the data. 
That is, the variability of output and inflation can be reduced by using highly 
aggressive rules, but such rules also induce wild fluctuations in interest rates. 
In this paper, we focus our attention on rules that feature relatively moderate 
levels of interest rate volatility. 
One argument for doing so is that the relatively low level of funds rate vola- 
tility seen in the data may  be a consequence of a preference on the part of 
policymakers for low interest rate volatility. Even if no fundamental  preference 
for low interest rate volatility exists, two reasons remain to focus on rules that 
generate moderate levels of interest rate volatility. First, linear policy rules that 
generate highly volatile interest rates prescribe frequent and large violations of 
the nonnegativity constraint on the federal funds rate. In principle, one could 
analyze nonlinear rules that incorporate this lower bound on interest rates, but 
doing so would substantially raise the computational costs of  our analysis.' 
4. Williams (1999) compares the characteristics of optimal policies under rational expectations 
and alternative assumptions regarding expectations formation using the FRB  staff model. 
5. Taylor (1979) and, more recently, Fuhrer (1997a). Svensson (1997; forthcoming), and Tetlow 
and Muehlen  (1996)  derive  optimal  policies  in  small  rational  expectations  structural  macro- 
economic models. 
6. This nonlinearity has been investigated in the FM, MSR, and FRB models. Fuhrer and Madi- 
gan (1997) conducted deterministic simulations of  the FM  model to assess the extent to which the 
zero bound prevents real rates from falling and thus cushioning aggregate output in response to 
negative spending shocks. Orphanides and Wieland (1998) perform stochastic simulations of the 
MSR model and find that (1) the effectiveness of monetary policy is significantly reduced at infla- 266  Andrew Levin, Volker Wieland, and John C. Williams 
Second, the hypothesized invariance of  the estimated model parameters to 
changes in policy rules is unlikely to hold true under policies that are so dra- 
matically different (in terms of  funds rate volatility) from those seen during 
the sample periods over which the models were estimated. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 6.2 provides a brief descrip- 
tion of the four models. Section 6.3 outlines the objective function and con- 
straints used in determining the policy frontiers of each model and describes 
the computational methods used to obtain these frontiers. Section 6.4 analyzes 
the inflation-output volatility frontier of each model for the following classes 
of policy rules: three-parameter rules in which the funds rate responds to the 
current output gap, the four-quarter average inflation rate, and the lagged funds 
rate; more complicated rules that incorporate a larger number of observed state 
variables; and rules that incorporate model-based forecasts of the output gap 
and inflation rate. This section also considers the extent to which these results 
are sensitive to the information lags that policymakers typically face. Section 
6.5 analyzes the performance of  other simple rules and investigates several 
potential explanations for the superior performance of rules with a coefficient 
near unity on the lagged interest rate. Section 6.6 compares the extent to which 
simple and complicated rules are robust to model uncertainty. Conclusions 
then follow. 
6.2  Comparison of Basic Model Properties 
This section provides a brief overview of the structure and basic properties 
of  the four models. Table 6.1 summarizes the basic features of  each model, 
including (1) the level of  aggregation for expenditures, prices, employment, 
and the external sector; (2)  the specification of  wage  and  price dynamics; 
(3) the forward-looking elements of the expenditure block, including the long- 
term bond maturity and the discount rate used  in computing permanent in- 
come; and (4) the sample period used in estimating each model. The behavioral 
equations of the FM model were estimated using full-information maximum 
likelihood, while a combination of  ordinary least squares, two-stage least 
squares, and generalized method of moments were used in estimating the pa- 
rameters of the other three models. 
6.2.1  Aggregate Demand 
The FM  model represents aggregate spending by  a single reduced-form 
equation corresponding to an IS curve. The current output gap depends on its 
~  ~~  -~  ~~ 
tion targets below 1 percent and (2) distortions due to the zero bound generate a nonvertical long- 
run Phillips curve and result in higher inflation and output variability. Reifschneider and Williams 
(1998) find that under standard linear policy rules, the zero bound begins to reduce stabilization 
performance in the FRB model for inflation targets below 2 percent; however, by modifying these 
rules to account for the nonnegativity constraint on the federal funds rate, the performance deterio- 
ration due to the zero bound can be nearly eliminated, even for a zero inflation target. 267  Robustness of  Simple Policy Rules under Model Uncertainty 
Table 6.1  Comparison of Model Specifications 






I  5  17  10 
2  2  7  5 
0  0  4  0 
1  2  7  2 
0  0  3"  95 
Wage and price dynamics  Staggered  Staggered  Generalized  Staggered 
real wage  real wage  adjustment  nominal wage 
contracts  contracts  costs  contracts 
Maturity of bond  10 years  2 years  5-30  yearsb  2 years 
Permanent income discount  10% per  7% per  10% per 
rate 
Estimation period 
n.a.  quarter  quarter  quarter 
1982-94  1980-96  1966-95  197  1-86 
"The full FRB model contains over 400 foreign variables; in the version of the FRB model used 
in this paper, these have been replaced by three equations for foreign output, foreign prices, and 
the price of imported oil. 
bThe  FRB model includes bonds with maturities of 5, 10, and 30 years, as well as equity prices. 
The 5-year bond is used in computing the cost of capital for business equipment and consumer 
purchases of durables. 
LThe  parameters of the FM model were estimated using the sample period  1966:l-94:l.  How- 
ever, in  constructing  the innovation covariance  matrix,  we  only  use  residuals  for  the  period 
1982:4-94:  1. 
lagged values over the past two quarters and the lagged value of the long-term 
real interest rate, which is defined as a weighted average of ex ante short-term 
real interest rates with maturity equivalent to a 10-year coupon bond. The pa- 
rameter estimates are taken from Fuhrer (1997a). The FM  model does not ex- 
plicitly include trade variables or exchange rates; instead, net exports (and the 
relationship between real interest rates and real exchange rates) are implicitly 
incorporated in the IS curve equation. 
The MSR model disaggregates real spending into five components: private 
consumption, fixed investment, inventory investment, net exports, and govern- 
ment purchase~.~  The aggregate demand components exhibit partial adjust- 
ment to their respective equilibrium levels, measured as shares of potential 
GDP. Equilibrium consumption is a function of permanent income (discounted 
10 percent per quarter) and the real two-year bond rate, equilibrium fixed in- 
vestment is a function of output growth and the real bond rate, and equilibrium 
inventory investment depends only on output growth. Equilibrium government 
purchases are a constant share of  GDP. Net exports are assumed to be fixed in 
the simulations reported here. 
TMCM  disaggregates IS  components further; for example, spending on 
7. The demand side of this model is similar to Taylor (1993a) and Taylor and Williams (1993), 
while the wage-price sector is taken from Fuhrer (1997b). 268  Andrew Levin, Volker Wieland, and John C. Williams 
fixed investment is separated into three components: equipment, nonresidential 
structures, and residential construction. The specification of these equations is 
very similar to that of the more aggregated equations in the MSR model. In 
TMCM, imports follow partial adjustment to an equilibrium level that depends 
on U.S. income and the relative price of  imports, while exports display partial 
adjustment to an equilibrium level that depends on foreign output and the rela- 
tive price of exports. Uncovered interest rate parity determines each bilateral 
exchange rate (up to a time-varying risk premium); for example, the expected 
one-period-ahead percentage change in the deutsche mark-dollar  exchange 
rate equals the current difference between U.S. and German short-term inter- 
est rates. 
The FRB model features about the same level of aggregation as TMCM for 
private spending but divides government spending into six components, each 
of  which follows a simple reduced-form equation. The specification of most 
nontrade private spending equations follows Tinsley’s (  1993) generalized ad- 
justment cost model. Each component has a specific flow or stock equilibrium 
condition; for example, equilibrium aggregate consumption is proportional to 
permanent income.8  Households and businesses adjust their spending in each 
category according to the solution of a quadratic adjustment cost problem. The 
resulting spending decision rules are specified as forward-looking error correc- 
tion equations: the current growth of each spending variable depends on up to 
three of  its own lagged values and on expected future growth in equilibrium 
spending and responds negatively to the lagged percentage deviation between 
actual and equilibrium spending levels. Exports and nonoil imports are speci- 
fied as error correction processes with long-run income and price elasticities 
set equal to unity. Uncovered interest rate parity determines the multilateral 
exchange rate, subject to a sovereign risk premium that moves with the U.S. 
net external asset position. 
6.2.2  Aggregate Supply 
In FM, MSR, and TMCM, the aggregate wage rate is determined by overlap- 
ping wage contracts. In particular, the aggregate wage is defined to be the 
weighted average of current and three lagged values of the contract wage rate. 
TMCM follows the specification in Taylor (1980), where the current nominal 
contract wage is determined as a weighted average of expected nominal con- 
tract wages, adjusted for the expected state of the economy over the life of the 
contract. FM and MSR use the overlapping real contract wage specification 
proposed by Buiter and Jewitt (1981) and implemented by Fuhrer and Moore 
(1995), in which the real contract wage-the  contract wage deflated by  the 
aggregate wage-is  determined as a weighted average of  expected real con- 
8. The consumption equations are based on the life cycle theory and include different marginal 
propensities to consume out of different categories of  wealth (labor income, property  income, 
stock market) reflecting the differing characteristics of the owners of these assets. See Brayton, 
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tract wages, adjusted for the expected average output gap over the life of the 
c~ntract.~ 
In FM and MSR, the aggregate price level is a constant markup over the ag- 
gregate wage rate. In contrast, the output price in TMCM follows a backward- 
looking error correction specification: current output price inflation depends 
positively on its own lagged value, on current wage inflation, and on lagged 
import price inflation and responds negatively (with a coefficient of  -0.2)  to 
the lagged percentage deviation of the actual price level from equilibrium. Im- 
port prices error-correct slowly to an equilibrium level equal to a constant 
markup over a weighted average of  foreign prices converted to dollars. This 
partial adjustment of import and output prices imparts somewhat more persis- 
tence  to  output  price  inflation  than  would  result  from  staggered nominal 
wages alone. 
The FRB model explicitly models potential output as a function of the labor 
force, crude energy use, and a composite capital stock, using a three-factor 
Cobb-Douglas  production  technology.  The  equilibrium  output  price  is  a 
markup over a weighted average of the productivity-adjusted wage rate and the 
domestic energy price. The specification of wage and price dynamics follows 
the generalized adjustment cost framework used in the FRB IS block. Wage 
inflation depends on lagged wage inflation over the previous three quarters, as 
well as expected future growth in prices and productivity, and a weighted aver- 
age of expected future unemployment rates. Price inflation depends on its own 
lagged values over the past two quarters, as well as expected future changes in 
equilibrium prices and expected future unemployment rates. In addition, both 
wages and prices error-correct to their respective equilibrium levels. As in the 
other models, a vertical long-run Phillips curve is imposed in estimation. 
Unlike the other three models, the FRB model contains a detailed account- 
ing of various categories of income, taxes, and stocks, an explicit treatment of 
labor markets, and endogenous determination of  potential output. Long-run 
equilibrium in the FRB  model is of the stock-flow type; the income tax rate 
and real exchange rate risk premium adjust over time to bring government and 
foreign debt-GDP ratios back to specified (constant) values. 
6.2.3  Foreign Sector 
Neither the FM nor the MSR model explicitly includes foreign variables; in 
contrast, both TMCM and the full FRB staff model include detailed treatments 
of foreign variables. TMCM features estimated equations for demand compo- 
nents and wages and prices for the other G-7 countries at about the level of 
aggregation of the U.S. sector. The full FRB  staff model includes a total of  12 
sectors (countries or regions) that encompass the entire global economy. Be- 
9. For the FM model, we use the estimated parameters from Fuhrer (1997a). The MSR model 
uses the parameter estimates of Fuhrer (1997b). for which the implied response of inflation to 
output gaps is smaller than that obtained by Fuhrer and Moore (1995) and substantially larger than 
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cause of the size of the model, the cost of solving and computing the moments 
of the full FRB model is prohibitive. Preliminary investigations using TMCM 
suggest that  the characteristics of  optimal US. monetary  policies  are not 
greatly affected by the precise specification of the foreign sector; the details of 
these results are described in the appendix.I0 Based on these results and the 
benefits of reduced computational cost, we replaced the full set of equations 
describing foreign countries in the FRE3  staff model with two simple reduced- 
form equations for foreign output and prices. For the remainder of the paper, 
we refer to this simplified version of the model as the FRB model." 
6.2.4  Dynamic Properties 
We  now turn to the basic dynamic properties of output and inflation-as 
measured by the unconditional autocorrelations-in  the four models. Because 
output and inflation dynamics are sensitive to the specification of  monetary 
policy, we begin by specifying a baseline monetary policy rule. For this pur- 
pose, we use the following interest rate reaction function, which was estimated 
using quarterly U.S.  data over the sample period 1980: 1-96:4: 
7  = -0.0042  +  0.7957-,  +  0.6251~~  +  1.171~~  - 0.967>3+, +  u,, 
(0.0036)  (0.07)  (0.13)  (0.26)  (0.23) 
R2 =  0.925,  SER  =  0.010,  DW  =  2.50, 
(1) 
where rf  is the federal funds rate, nTT,  is the four-quarter moving average of the 
inflation rate, and  yr  is the current output gap.'* Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 
(1998) and others argue that this period was characterized by  a fairly stable 
policy regime that differed substantially from that of  the  1960s and  1970s. 
This estimated policy rule features a relatively large coefficient on the lagged 
funds rate and a fairly aggressive response to increases in inflation and output 
gaps. Furthermore, the pattern of  coefficients on the output gap and its lag 
suggest that policy not only responded to the level of  output but also its re- 
cent growth. 
Given this interest rate reaction function, we compute the dynamic proper- 
ties of each model using the solution methods described in section 6.3 below. 
The inflation autocorrelogram of each model under the estimated policy rule 
10. E.g., using TMCM, we computed optimal policies under two alternative assumptions re- 
garding foreign monetary policies. In the baseline case, each foreign country is assumed to follow 
an independent constant growth rule for money; in the alternative case, the EU countries are as- 
sumed to follow a single currency policy described by a Taylor (1993a) rule, and Canada and Japan 
follow independent policies using the same Taylor rule specification. The optimal US.  policy rules 
were almost identical across the two cases. 
11. This version of the model is typically referred to as FRBKJS, while the full model is referred 
to as FFWGLOBAL. 
12. Inflation is measured using the chain-weighted GDP deflator, and the output gap is based 
on estimates of potential output supplied by the Congressional Budget Office. This rule forms part 
of  the MSR model and is taken from Orphanides and Wieland (1998). 271  Robustness of  Simple Policy Rules under Model Uncertainty 
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Fig. 6.1  Persistence implications of four models 
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is depicted in the left-hand panel of figure 6.1.13  Inflation is highly persistent 
in the FM and MSR models, a feature of the overlapping real wage contract 
that Fuhrer and Moore (1995) have emphasized. The FRB model exhibits 
somewhat less inflation persistence, but by  far the least degree of inflation 
persistence is found in TMCM, for which the inflation autocorrelogram falls 
below zero after only four quarters. Even when combined with some inertia in 
price markups, the staggered nominal wage contract specification in TMCM 
delivers relatively low inflation persistence. 
The right-hand panel of figure 6.1 depicts the output gap autocorrelogram 
of  each model. In the FM model, the output gap is extremely persistent and 
displays some “overshooting” in that the autocorrelation turns negative after 
five years. The FRB model output gap displays considerably less persistence 
and slightly more overshooting than the FM model. The MSR and TMCM 
models-based  on similar aggregate demand specifications-share  the feature 
of  a relatively low degree of  output gap persistence, although it is slightly 
higher in the MSR model because the monetary policy response to inflation 
causes some of the persistence in inflation to spill over to output. 
To provide a more detailed comparison of the dynamic properties of aggre- 
gate demand across models, it is useful to consider the following regression 
equation: 
(2)  AY,  = -  Q-, +  0 AY,,_,  - +(rr-, - E,-,n,)  +  E, 
where r,-, -  E,-, a,  is the lagged value of the ex ante real federal funds rate. 
The parameter 6 indicates the degree of persistence (speed of error correction) 
13. Throughout the paper, inflation refers to the growth in the GDP price level for FM, MSR, 
and TMCM, and that of the personal consumption price index for FRB. 272  Andrew Levin, Volker Wieland, and John C. Williams 
Table 6.2  Comparison of Output Dynamics 
Models 
Coefficient  FM  MSR  TMCM  FRB  1966:  1-95:4 
US.  Data 
6  0.04  0.17  0.3  1  0.05  0.10 (0.03) 
0  0.49  0.45  -0.04  0.26  0.29 (0.08)  +  0.03  0.05  0.06  0.04  0.08 (0.03) 
Note; This table considers regression equation (2). The first four columns report asymptotic values 
of S,8,  and 4 for each of the four models, while the final column reports the coefficient estimates 
and ordinary  least squares standard errors of  this regression equation  using US.  data for the 
sample period 1966:  1-95:4.  For the data regression, expected inflation is proxied by  the lagged 
inflation rate. 
of  the output gap, the parameter 0 indicates the extent to which the output 
gap exhibits a short-run accelerator effect, and the parameter c$  indicates the 
sensitivity of aggregate demand to a change in the short-term real interest rate. 
We use this simple specification to compare the basic properties of output dy- 
namics between the models and to the data. 
Table 6.2 indicates the asymptotic values of  6, 0, and + for each model 
computed using the unconditional moments of each model, and the estimated 
coefficients and standard errors obtained from fitting equation (2)  using U.S. 
data  over  the  sample period  1966:l-95:4.  Although  the  MSR  model  and 
TMCM have  roughly similar output autocorrelograms, the table shows that 
these models actually imply very different behavior for the output gap. In par- 
ticular, the output gap in TMCM error-corrects to zero rapidly and displays 
essentially no accelerator effect, whereas the output gap in the MSR model 
error-corrects more gradually and displays a strong accelerator effect. The FM 
and FRB models both imply a relatively high degree of persistence, while the 
accelerator effect in FM is nearly twice as strong as in the FRB model. Finally, 
the coefficients on the real short-term interest rate are similar across the four 
models, with FM displaying the least real interest rate sensitivity of output. 
6.3  Computing Policy Frontiers 
In this section, we indicate the methods used to solve each model and obtain 
its unconditional moments for a specific interest rate rule. Then we specify the 
objective function and constraints faced by  the monetary policymaker, and we 
describe the methods used  to obtain the optimal parameter values in  each 
model for a given functional form of the interest rate rule. 
6.3.1  Analyzing a Specific Rule 
Our analysis incorporates a wide variety of interest rate rules, in which the 
federal funds rate may depend on its own lagged values as well as the current, 273  Robustness of  Simple Policy Rules under Model Uncertainty 
lagged, and expected future values of  other model variables. In general, the 
interest rate rule can be expressed as follows: 
(3) 
where r, is the federal funds rate and the column vector z  is a set of  model 
variables that enter the interest rate reaction function. The lagged funds rate 
coefficients are given by the row vector H,!  (j  = 1 to I),  while the coefficients 
on other model variables are given by the row vectors H:  (j  = 1 to m) and H,” 
(j  = 0 to n).  Henceforth we will refer to the combined set of  coefficients by 
the vector H  = {HI;  H2;  H3).  After discussing how to compute the moments 
of each model for a specific value of H, we  will consider the problem of de- 
termining the optimal value of H  for a given choice of the elements of z and 
the lead and lag orders 1, m, and n. 
As in Fuhrer (1997a), we analyze the performance of a specified policy rule 
in each model by computing the reduced-form representation of  the saddle- 
point solution and then evaluating an analytic expression for the unconditional 
second moments of  the model variables. For linear models, this approach 
yields accurate results far more efficiently than simulation-based methods. To 
take advantage of these methods, we have constructed a linearized version of 
TMCM and a log-linear version of the FRB  model; however, these approxima- 
tions have  negligible effects on the relevant dynamic properties of  the two 
models. 
Thus each of the four models can be written in the following form: 
(4) 
M  N 
J=l  ,=0  C  A,E,x,+~  +  C B,X,+~  +  Ce,  =  0, 
where x is the vector of all model variables and e is a vector of serially uncorre- 
lated disturbances with mean zero and finite covariance matrix a.  The interest 
rate reaction function comprises a single row  of  equation (4),  while the re- 
maining rows contain the structural equations of the model. Thus the parame- 
ters of the interest rate rule are contained in one row of the coefficient matrices 
AJ  ( j = 1  to M)  and Bj  (  j =  0  to  N),  while this row of C  is identically equal to zero. 
We compute the unique stationary rational expectations solution to equation 
(4) using the Anderson and Moore (1985) implementation of  the Blanchard 
and Kahn (1980) method, modified to take advantage of  sparse matrix func- 
tion~.~~  The reduced form of this solution can be expressed as follows: 
14. The algorithm is discussed in more detail in Anderson (1997). Sumner and Williams (1998) 
discuss methods to improve the computational efficiency of  algorithms to solve linear rational 
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where the reduced-form coefficient matrices Dj (J  = 1 to K)  and F depend on 
the monetary policy parameters  H  as well as the structural parameters of the 
model. By defining the vector r?, = (x,-,,  . . . ,  X,-~)’,  we can express this solu- 
tion in companion form: 
Then the unconditional contemporaneous covariance matrix for TI,  denoted by 
V,,  is given by 
Using the implicit expression V, = PV,P’  + QnQ’,  we compute V,  iteratively 
using the doubling algorithm described in Hansen and Sargent (1997), modi- 
fied to take advantage of sparse matrix functions. Given Vo,  the autocovariance 
matrices of 2,  are readily computed using the relationship 
6.3.2  The Optimization Problem 
interest rate rule is chosen to solve the following optimization problem: 
= PW,. 
For a given functional form of  the interest rate rule, we assume that the 
mjnhvar(yl) + (1 - X) var(n:) 
such thati,  =  P(H)i,+,  +  Q(H)e,,  var(Ar,)  5  k’, 
where y,  indicates the output gap, n,! indicates the one-quarter  inflation rate, 
and var(s) indicates the unconditional  variance of variable s. The weight h E 
[0,1]  reflects the policymaker’s preference for minimizing output volatility rela- 
tive to inflation volatility. We constrain the level of interest rate volatility by 
imposing the upper bound k on the standard deviation of the first difference of 
the federal funds rate; as discussed below, the benchmark value of k is set equal 
to the funds rate volatility under the estimated policy rule given in equation (1). 
Finally, throughout our analysis, we only consider policy rules that generate a 
unique stationary rational expectations solution. 
To  compute the policy  frontier of  each model for a particular  functional 
form of  the interest rate rule, we determine the parameters  of this rule that 
maximize the objective function for each value of A  over the range zero to 
unity. Thus, for a given form of the interest rate rule, the policy  frontier of 
each model traces out the best obtainable combinations of output and inflation 
volatility, subject to the upper bound on funds rate volatility. This approach 
differs slightly from that commonly found in the literature, in which interest 
rate volatility is incorporated into the objective function and each policy fron- 
tier is drawn using a different weight on interest rate volatility. The standard 
approach combines information  about model-imposed constraints on policy 275  Robustness of Simple Policy Rules under Model Uncertainty 
with policymakers’ preferences regarding funds rate volatility, whereas we pre- 
fer to maintain a strict distinction between the policymaker’s preferences and 
the constraints implied by the model. 
To obtain a benchmark value of  k for each model, we  obtain the rational 
expectations solution generated by  the estimated policy rule in equation (l), 
and then we compute the standard deviation of the one-quarter change in the 
funds rate associated with this rule. It should be noted that this benchmark 
value of k differs across the four models, in part because each model has been 
estimated over a different sample period and as a result generates a different 
amount of funds rate volatility for the same policy rule. For example, the mo- 
ments for the FRB model and TMCM depend in part on shocks from the 
1970s-a  period of  substantial economic turbulence-while  the shocks for 
the FM  and MSR  models are from the relatively tranquil  1980s and early 
1990s. Henceforth, when we construct a policy frontier subject to the bench- 
mark constraint that funds rate volatility does not exceed that of the estimated 
rule, we refer to the resulting policy frontier as an E-frontier. 
For a particular functional form of the interest rate rule, we determine the 
policy frontier by solving the optimization problem in equation (8) for a range 
of values of the objective function weight A. For a given value of  A, we start 
with an initial guess for the rule parameters, obtain the reduced-form solution 
matrices G and H,  compute the unconditional moments, and calculate the value 
of the objective function; then a hill-climbing algorithm is applied that itera- 
tively updates the parameter vector until an optimum is obtained. 
Thus, to determine a single policy frontier, it is necessary to compute hun- 
dreds or even thousands of rational expectations solutions at alternative values 
of the policy rule parameters. Given our objective of performing a systematic 
analysis of policy frontiers for a wide range of functional forms of the interest 
rate rule, it is essential to make use of the highly efficient solution algorithms 
outlined above. On a Sun Ultra Enterprise 3000 computer-about  as fast as an 
Intel Pentium I1 300 MHz computer-only  a few CPU seconds are needed to 
solve and compute the moments of a small-scale model like FM or MSR, while 
solving a large-scale macroeconometric model like TMCM or the FRB model 
requires about five CPU minutes. 
6.4  Policy Frontiers for Simple and Complicated Rules 
In this section, we analyze the properties of policy frontiers for several alter- 
native specifications: rules in which the federal funds rate responds to only 
three variables (the current output gap, the four-quarter average inflation rate, 
and the lagged funds rate), more complicated rules that incorporate a larger 
number of  observed state variables, and rules that incorporate model-based 
forecasts of the output gap and inflation rate. Finally, we consider the extent to 
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Fig. 6.2  Policy frontiers for three-parameter rules 
6.4.1  Simple Policy Rules 
We start by considering three-parameter rules in which the federal funds rate 
rr is determined as a linear function of  the current output gap, yr, the four- 
quarter average inflation rate, n,, and the lagged funds rate, r,-,: 
(9)  r,  =  v,-,  + (1 - p)(r*  +  T,)  +  4nr - n*>  +  PY,, 
where r* is the unconditional mean of the equilibrium real interest rate and T* 
is the inflation target (both assumed to be constant throughout this paper).15 
The solid lines in figure 6.2 depict the three-parameter E-frontier of  each 
model. As expected, the frontier is convex to the origin, with truncated vertical 
and horizontal asymptotes as the objective function in equation (8) switches 
from exclusive concern about stabilizing inflation (A  = 0) toward exclusive 
concern about stabilizing output (A = 1). Because we restrict attention to pol- 
15. Because we ignore the nonnegativity constraint on nominal interest rates, we implicitly 
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icy rules that generate a unique stationary rational expectations equilibrium, 
the unconditional variance of inflation is finite even in the case where A = 1. 
Each panel of figure 6.2 also indicates the relative performance of the esti- 
mated rule, denoted by  the letter E. Because the estimated rule generates the 
same amount of funds rate volatility as the three-parameter E-frontier of each 
model, comparison of  the estimated rule to the policy frontier is straightfor- 
ward. The estimated rule performs appreciably worse than the optimal three- 
parameter rules for MSR, FRB, and TMCM, despite the fact that the estimated 
rule incorporates an additional variable (the lagged output gap). As discussed 
below, the optimal value of p for these three models is substantially higher than 
the estimated value of about 0.8 shown in equation (1). 
The coefficient values for optimal three-parameter rules are shown in figure 
6.3. In each model, a lower inflation coefficient generates a higher standard 
deviation of  inflation, as one would expect. The output gap coefficients vary 
somewhat less along each policy frontier. The output gap coefficients for MSR 
are close to unity along the whole policy frontier. In the FRB model, the output 278  Andrew Levin, Volker Wieland, and John C. Williams 
gap coefficient is smaller for rules corresponding to low values of  A  but is 
otherwise quite close to unity. The output gap coefficient in TMCM ranges 
between 0.6 and 1.5 along the policy frontier. Finally, the optimal output gap 
and inflation coefficients for the FM model are much smaller than for the other 
three models. 
The key result to be noted from figure 6.3 is that the three-parameter policy 
frontiers of all four models are associated with rules in which the coefficient p 
on the lagged funds rate is very close to unity. In particular, the parameter p 
takes values in the range [0.84, 0.951 for the FM model, [  1  .O,  1.11 for the MSR 
model, [0.92, 1.031 for the FRB model, and [0.94,0.98] for TMCM. Thus, as 
noted above, the relatively poor performance of the estimated reaction function 
in the latter three models can be attributed mainly to the fact that the estimated 
value of p = 0.8 in equation (1) is substantially smaller than the optimal value 
of p for these models. 
To examine this feature more closely, we consider the class of  first-differ- 
ence rules, which are a special case of the three-parameter rules described by 
the previous equation: 
For three of  the four models (MSR, FRB, and TMCM), the E-frontier for 
first-difference rules is virtually identical to the three-parameter E-frontier; 
that is, imposing the constraint p = 1 is essentially costless in these models. 
For the FM  model, first-difference rules are associated with slightly higher 
output and inflation volatility compared with three-parameter rules, as seen by 
comparing the dashed and solid lines in the upper left-hand panel of figure 6.2. 
Finally, the lower left-hand panel of  figure 6.2 shows that stabilization per- 
formance deteriorates substantially in the FRB model if the simple policy rule 
is expressed in terms of  the one-quarter inflation rate rather than the four- 
quarter average inflation rate. In all four models, policy rules that incorporate 
the four-quarter average inflation rate are strictly preferred to alternative rules 
that utilize a higher-frequency measure of the inflation rate.I6 The one-quarter 
inflation rate contains a substantial amount of high-frequency noise that is es- 
sentially unforecastable and immune to stabilization efforts; the four-quarter 
average inflation rate filters out some of this noise. 
6.4.2  Complicated Policy Rules 
In  the simple rules described by  equations (9) and (lo), the funds rate is 
adjusted in response to only three variables: the current output gap, the four- 
16. In this paper, we focus on rules in which the inflation variable is defined as the four-quarter 
average inflation rate. In fact, for the FM, MSR, and FRB models, using an even lower frequency 
measure of the inflation rate (e.g..  the eight-quarter or twelve-quarter average inflation rate) pro- 
vides small improvement in terms of the best obtainable outcomes for output and inflation volatil- 
ity,  while the four-quarter average inflation rate works best in TMCM.  However, it should be 
emphasized that the results of  this paper are not sensitive to the choice between a four-quarter, 
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quarter average inflation rate, and the lagged interest rate. In practice, central 
banks have access to far more information about the state of  the economy. 
Optimal control theory indicates that the policy rule should incorporate all rel- 
evant information; that is, the rule should involve all of the state variables of 
the specific economic model under consideration. Thus, we investigate the ex- 
tent to which complicated rules that respond to expanded subsets of the state 
variables can generate substantially lower output and inflation volatility. 
Due to computational costs, our analysis of  this issue focuses on the two 
smaller models, FM  and MSR, for which we can obtain policy frontiers for 
rules that include all observed state variables. The FM  model contains eight 
such variables (the lagged interest rate, the current values of  the output gap 
and one-quarter inflation rate, two lags of the output gap, and three lags of the 
one-quarter inflation rate), while the MSR model contains twenty observed 
state variables. We have also investigated rules with up to six parameters in the 
FRB model and TMCM; the results of those experiments confirm the findings 
reported here for the two smaller models. 
For the FM model, we find that the optimal eight-parameter rules put sub- 
stantial weight on one or both of  the lagged output terms that are excluded 
from the three-parameter policy rules. Furthermore, the optimal eight-param- 
eter rules typically exhibit complicated patterns of weights on the current and 
lagged one-quarter inflation rates, whereas these weights are constrained to be 
equal in the three-parameter policy rules (which only respond  to the four- 
quarter average inflation rate). Evidently, the optimal eight-parameter rules are 
fine-tuned to the model, in the sense that the pattern of coefficients on lagged 
output and inflation reflects the dynamic properties of the FM  model. Never- 
theless, as seen in the left-hand panel of figure 6.4, the eight-parameter policy 
frontier is nearly indistinguishable from the three-parameter policy frontier; 280  Andrew Levin, Volker Wieland, and John C. Williams 
that is, more complicated rules provide only negligible improvements in output 
and inflation stability beyond that achieved by optimal simple rules. 
Because demand is disaggregated into four components in the MSR model, 
additional gains in performance might be expected by  augmenting the three- 
parameter rule in equation (9) to allow policy to respond differently to con- 
sumption, fixed investment, inventory investment, and government spending. 
Thus we consider twelve-parameter rules that include current values of these 
four components of  aggregate demand as well as the variables in the eight- 
parameter rules described above. Unsurprisingly, the optimal twelve-parameter 
rules exhibit complicated coefficient patterns that are fine-tuned to the dynam- 
ics of the model. The right-hand panel of figure 6.4 shows that these compli- 
cated twelve-parameter rules yield visible but not striking improvements in 
output and  inflation  stability compared with  simple three-parameter rules. 
Augmenting the twelve-parameter rule with other observed state variables (i.e., 
the lagged values of  the individual components of  aggregate demand) yields 
trivial improvements in the policy frontier. 
We conclude from this analysis that small improvements in output and infla- 
tion stability may be possible by including more variables (i.e., more informa- 
tion about the state of the economy) in the interest rate rule. Of  course, such 
benefits may  be offset by  the lower degree of  transparency associated with 
complicated policy rules. Furthermore, section 6.6 considers the implications 
of model uncertainty and provides evidence that complicated policy rules are 
somewhat less robust than optimal simple rules. 
6.4.3  Rules with Model-Based Forecasts 
Simple policy rules that incorporate model-based forecasts of the output gap 
and inflation rate implicitly respond to all the observed states in the model 
(albeit in a highly restricted fashion) but are relatively parsimonious in terms 
of the number of free parameters in the rule. We have already noted that small 
reductions in output and inflation volatility can be obtained using complicated 
rules that respond to a large number of observed state variables. We now analyze 
the extent to which these performance gains can be achieved by simple rules that 
incorporate forecasts of the output gap and inflation rate. In this analysis, we 
assume the forecasts are consistent with the model and are known to the public. 
Using three different approaches to incorporating model-based forecasts of 
the output gap and inflation rate, we find negligible benefits from using model- 
based forecasts rather than realized values of these variables. First, when we 
augment the class of three-parameter rules to allow policy to respond addition- 
ally to one-quarter and two-quarter forecasts of the output gap or the inflation 
rate, or both, we find very little improvement in performance relative to optimal 
three-parameter rules based only on current and lagged variables. Second, we 
consider three-parameter rules in which the current output gap is replaced by 
model-based forecasts of the future output gap at various horizons. In all four 
models, rules that respond to forecasts of  the output gap yield at best very 281  Robustness of Simple Policy Rules under Model Uncertainty 
small improvements over rules that respond to the current output gap. Finally, 
we consider three-parameter rules that replace the current four-quarter average 
inflation rate with a model-based forecast of this inflation rate, at a forecast 
horizon of one to four quarters. For the FM and MSR models, using a model- 
based inflation forecast always results in worse performance than using the 
current inflation rate. For TMCM and the FREi  model, using the two-quarter- 
ahead model-based inflation forecast generates a very small improvement in 
performance compared with using the current inflation rate. 
6.4.4  Information Lags 
In the preceding analysis, we have sidestepped one potentially important is- 
sue: policymakers may not have full knowledge of the current state of the econ- 
omy but instead must act on data that comes in with a lag of  weeks, months, 
or even longer. As McCallum (1994, 1997) has emphasized, policy rules must 
be operational in the sense that they can be implemented in real time. In this 
paper, we do not examine the implications of using mismeasured data but in- 
stead focus on the impact of information lags.” 
A one-quarter information lag probably provides an accurate representation 
of the time delay with which information becomes available to policymakers. 
The first “advance” release of quarterly National Income and Product Accounts 
data occurs within one month of  the end of  the quarter, and monthly labor 
market and consumer price index data are available by the middle of the fol- 
lowing month. Other weekly and monthly data become available with short 
lags. To make the contrast to the results based on complete current information 
as stark as possible, we restrict ourselves to policies that depend only on lagged 
inflation, output gaps, and interest rates. We  do not consider rules that incor- 
porate current-quarter forecasts based on lagged information; if anything, our 
approach introduces an additional upward bias in assessing the true costs asso- 
ciated with information lags. 
Figure 6.5 compares the three-parameter policy frontiers using current and 
lagged variables. The imposition of lagged variables in the rule imposes minis- 
cule costs in terms of stabilization in the FM and FRB  models, and relatively 
small costs  in  the  MSR  model  and  TMCM. The  characteristics of  well- 
performing rules are also essentially unchanged. Evidently, a one-quarter in- 
formation lag does not inhibit effective inflation and output stabilization in the 
models we consider here. 
The reason for these small costs is that inflation and output are highly persis- 
tent in all four models, and thus the lagged inflation rate and lagged output gap 
are good proxies for the current values of these variables. Nevertheless, the 
degree of output persistence does vary across the four models and largely ac- 
17. Sources of  mismeasurement relevant for policy rules include the noise in the data due to 
sampling and data imputation methods and imprecise estimation of potential output and the natural 
rate of  unemployment.  Orphanides  (1998) studies the relevance of  measurement problems for 




2  Q 
c  a 
P 
U  c 
m  m 
FM  MSR 
Standard Deviation of Inflation 
FR0 




c  2.4 
._  2.2 
0  2.0 
E 
,  ._ 
I  . 
W 
c 
1.65  1.75  1.85 
Standard Deviation of Inflation  Standard Deviation of Inflation 
Fig. 6.5  Implications of using lagged information 
counts for the differences in the costs of information lags. For the MSR model 
and TMCM, which display relatively low output persistence (first-order auto- 
correlation under first-difference rules of about .75 and .5,  respectively), the 
cost of  using lagged output gaps is larger than for the FM and FRB models 
with relatively high output persistence (.95 and .85 first-order autocorrelations 
under first-difference rules, respectively). In the case of inflation, any effects 
on performance due to the use of lagged variables is further dampened by the 
fact that rules on the three-parameter policy frontier involve the four-quarter 
average inflation rate. The marginal impact of the current inflation rate is thus 
relatively small, so the shift in timing has little effect on the stabilization prop- 
erties of rules on the policy frontier. 
6.5  Comparison of Alternative Simple Rules 
In  this  section,  we  focus  in  greater  detail  on  the  properties  of  three- 
parameter rules of the form given in equation (9). This class of policy rules 
nests  “level” rules  such as those  considered by  Henderson and McKibbin 283  Robustness of Simple Policy Rules under Model Uncertainty 
Table 6.3  Parameter Values of Alternative Simple Rules 
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(1993) and Taylor (1993a), in which the lagged funds rate coefficient p = 0. 
We  shall use the term “interest rate smoothing” to refer to rules in which this 
coefficient is substantially larger than zero, as in partial adjustment rules (0 < 
p < 1) and first-difference rules (p = l).I*  As shown previously in figure 6.3, 
the optimal value of p even exceeds unity in certain cases but is never quite as 
large as the optimal values obtained by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). Of 
course, level rules are also associated with persistence in the funds rate because 
output and inflation exhibit substantial persistence in all four models. 
Table 6.3 indicates the values of a,  p, and p for eight different rules in this 
class. Rules A and B are taken from the E-frontier of the FRB model, with the 
value of  p constrained to unity. These rules correspond to values of  X = 0.25 
and A  = 0.75, respectively (i.e., the weight on output volatility relative to in- 
flation volatility), in the objective function given in equation (8). The two rules 
labeled C and D are more aggressive rules that stabilize output and inflation 
more effectively than rules A and B but induce substantially higher interest 
rate ~olatility.’~  Rule T is the rule proposed by  Taylor (1993a). Rule T2 is a 
modified version of Taylor’s rule in which the coefficient on the output gap has 
been doubled. Rules V and W are optimal policy rules for the dynamic general 
equilibrium model analyzed by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). 
Table 6.4 clearly shows that rules T and T2, in which the level of the funds 
18. In the existing literature (e.g., Lowe and Ellis 1997; Goodhart 1998), the phrase “interest 
rate smoothing” has been used to refer to two different (albeit related) characteristics of interest 
rate behavior: (1) the degree of persistence in interest rates that results from partial adjustment or 
error correction specifications of the interest rate reaction function and (2) a policy preference for 
reducing the variance of short-term interest rates. Throughout this paper, we use the phrase “inter- 
est rate smoothing” to refer to policy rules in which the partial adjustment parameter p is signifi- 
cantly greater than zero and avoid using the phrase to refer to rules that generate relatively low 
interest rate volatility. 
19. Rules C and D are included here to maintain consistency with the specifications used by 
other authors in this volume; these are the rules labeled I and 11,  respectively, in table  1 of the 
editor’s introduction by John Taylor. The parameters of rules C and D were originally chosen based 
on a specification of the three-parameter rule that incorporated the twelve-quarter average inflation 












































































































































































Nore: The U.S. data use a measure of  potential output provided by  the Congressional Budget 
Office. Caution should be  used in comparing the sample moments with those of  each model, 
because the sample period involves an exceptionally high initial inflation rate, whereas the model- 
based moments are unconditional deviations from steady state. 285  Robustness of Simple Policy Rules under Model Uncertainty 
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rate responds to the output gap and inflation rate, are dominated by rules like 
A and B, where thejrst difference of the funds rate responds to the output gap 
and inflation rate. Rules V and W perform relatively poorly in stabilizing out- 
put and inflation in all four models. One reason for these poor results is that 
rules V and W set p to about 1.3, which is much larger than the optimal range 
of about 0.9 to 1.1 for the four models considered here. Furthermore, even if 
policymakers only care about stabilizing inflation (i.e., X = 0), the output gap 
coefficient should generally be larger than the values of 0.06 and 0.08 used in 
rules V and W,  respectively, because the current output gap is an important 
leading indicator for the inflation rate. 
Figure 6.6 provides further information on the benefits of a large coefficient 
on the lagged funds rate in comparison with level rules. The solid line indicates 
the E-frontier associated with level rules-that  is, the inflation-output volatil- 
ity frontier for rules having the form of equation (9) with  p = 0, under the 
constraint that the standard deviation of Ar does not exceed that generated by 
the estimated rule in  equation (1). The dotted and dashed lines  show  the 286  Andrew Levin, Volker Wieland, and John C. Williams 
E-frontiers for three-parameter and first-difference rules, as previously de- 
picted in figure 6.2. As previously noted, the E-frontiers for three-parameter 
and first-difference rules are virtually identical for three of the models, while 
the optimal three-parameter rules associated with the FM model incorporate 
values of p that are large but noticeably smaller than unity. 
Figure 6.6 reveals very substantial gains from setting p near unity in all 
four models. In fact, these are the largest gains we have found among all the 
permutations of  simple policy rules that we have investigated.20  In the FXB 
model, for example, using a first-difference rule instead of  a level rule can 
reduce the standard deviation of output by a full percentage point. 
Although empirical evidence reveals a pattern of interest rate smoothing in 
many industrial countries and is a property of the estimated U.S. interest rate 
rule in equation (l),  the normative case for interest rate smoothing has re- 
mained much less clear.*’ Lowe and Ellis (1997) have recently surveyed the 
literature and summarized several considerations that tend to favor interest rate 
smoothing.2z  One argument, advanced by Goodfriend (1991) and others, is par- 
ticularly relevant to our analysis. For a given movement in the short-term inter- 
est rate, the impact on long-term interest rates is greater if the movement is 
expected to be sustained rather than short-lived. Thus interest rate smoothing 
offers the potential for greater control over long-term bond rates and hence 
over aggregate demand and inflation. 
This rationale for interest rate smoothing is explicitly captured in the four 
rational expectations models considered here: in each model, monetary policy 
stabilizes output and inflation mainly through its influence on the long-term 
real interest rate, which is determined as a weighted average of current and 
expected future short-term rates.23  For a given set of  economic conditions, 
movements in the federal funds rate are expected to persist longer under the 
first-difference rule compared to the level rule; thus a given initial adjustment 
of the federal funds rate induces a larger movement in the long-term bond rate 
and thereby achieves more rapid stabilization of output and inflation. 
20. The beneficial impact of interest rate smoothing extends to models that fall outside the class 
of models we consider here, such as the models in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Rebelo 
and Xie (1997), that explicitly incorporate optimizing behavior of representative agents. 
21. Clarida et al. (1998) also document the practice of interest rate smoothing for U.S. mone- 
tary policy. 
22. E.g.,  policymakers  may  dislike frequent reversals  in interest  rates, either  because  such 
changes make the policymaker look poorly informed and undermine confidence in the central 
bank as argued by Caplin and Leahy (1996) or because it is difficult to obtain broad-based political 
support for such changes in direction as suggested hy Goodhart (1996). Furthermore, by avoiding 
large movements in interest rates the central bank can reduce financial market volatility and in 
doing so reduces the likelihood of instability when particular institutions incur large losses. Fi- 
nally, the nature of the decision-making process may lead to caution. E.g., Alan Blinder (1995), 
when vice-chairman of the Board of Governors, argued that uncertainty that policymakers have 
about the parameters of the underlying model justifies “stodginess” in monetary policy; see also 
the discussion in Blinder (1998). 
23. TMCM and FRB also include an explicit exchange rate channel of monetary policy, while 
FRB includes a channel for wealth, which is negatively related to long-term real interest rates. 287  Robustness of Simple Policy Rules under Model Uncertainty 
To  evaluate the role of  this mechanism in explaining the superior perfor- 
mance of  rules with a large coefficient on the lagged funds rate, we conduct 
counterfactual experiments in each of the two smaller models, FM  and MSR. 
In particular, we shorten the maturity of the term structure equation and com- 
pute new constrained inflation-output volatility frontiers based on rules with 
three parameters. In the FM model, we replace the 30-year bond rate with the 
current short-term rate in the IS curve.24  We  find that the range of values of p 
along the frontier declines from [0.85,0.95] to [0.56, .08]. In the MSR model, 
we replace the eight-quarter maturity bond with the current funds rate in the 
consumption and investment equations and find that the range of coefficients 
on the lagged federal funds rate along the frontier declines from [  1  .O,  1.11 to 
[0.75, 1.01. Thus, in both models, the optimal coefficient on the lagged funds 
rate is significantly reduced when the maturity of the relevant long rate is short- 
ened. 
In addition to the forward-looking characteristics of long-term bond rates, it 
is useful to consider several other factors that may contribute to the superior 
performance of rules with a large coefficient on the lagged funds rate. First, 
control theory suggests that the optimal policy rule should take into account 
all available information, including lagged values of the output gap and infla- 
tion rate. A rule with a high value of  p implicitly makes the current interest 
rate depend on the complete history of output and inflation, albeit in a very re- 
stricted way. Thus the lagged funds rate may be serving as a simple proxy that 
permits additional information to be included in a suboptimal level rule. 
We  test this explanation by  computing frontiers for rules that include all 
observable state variables and then checking whether these complicated rules 
are characterized by smaller lagged funds rate coefficients. Because of the high 
computational cost of conducting this experiment, we focus on the small mod- 
els, FM and MSR. The policy frontiers associated with complicated rules for 
these models have already been shown in figure 6.4. Here we simply note that 
rules that include all observed state variables call for somewhat smaller coef- 
ficients on the lagged funds rate. In the FM model, the range of values of  p 
along the frontier is almost identical for the case of three-parameter rules as 
for rules that respond to all observable state variables, while in the MSR model, 
the range of  values of  p decline from [  1  .O,  1.11 to [0.9, 1  .O]  for rules that re- 
spond to all observed state variables. 
Next, we consider the relationship between the optimal value of  p and the 
preference for funds rate volatility implicitly imposed in drawing the frontiers. 
For each model, figure 6.7 shows three frontiers with different restrictions on 
funds rate volatility. In each case the baseline E-frontier is shown as a solid 
line. Using frontier rules as a guide, the stabilization gains from increased 
funds rate volatility are evidently rather small. Table 6.5 shows typical values 
24. We reduced the coefficient on the real rate to avoid increasing the interest  sensitivity of 
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Fig. 6.7  Alternative constraints on funds rate volatility 
of the standard deviation of the level of the funds rate generated by the policies 
that underlie the frontiers shown in the figure. In each case, outcomes corre- 
sponding to the baseline E-frontier are given in the first two columns. Except 
for the MSR model, relaxing the constraint on funds rate volatility much be- 
yond that implied by the E-frontier entails so much volatility of the level of the 
funds rate that the optimal policy rule would regularly dictate negative nomi- 
nal interest rates when the steady state nominal interest rate-that  is, the sum 
of  the steady state real interest rate and the target inflation rate-is  reason- 
ably low. 
In all four models, relaxing the constraint on interest rate volatility results 
in  smaller values of  p for the three-parameter rules on  the policy  frontier. 
However, the quantitative results differ somewhat across models. In the FM 
model, the reduction in p is particularly pronounced: doubling the upper bound 
on  SD(Ar) causes the  range of  values for  p to  drop  from  [0.85,0.95] to 
[0.75, 0.921. In the other three models, relaxing the funds rate volatility con- 
straint leads to somewhat smaller reductions in the optimal value of  p.  In the 289  Robustness of  Simple Policy Rules under Model Uncertainty 
Table 6.5  Volatility of Funds Rate Levels and Changes 
Alternative Frontier 
with Doubled 
E-Frontier  Volatility 




SD(Ar)  SWr) 
FM  1  5  2  I 
MSR  0.6  1.5  1.2  2.3 
FRB  1.2  4.5  2.4  6 
TMCM  2.6  6  5.1  9 
3  9 
1  .I  2.9 
3.1  9 
1.7  11 
FRB model, doubling SD(Ar) reduces the optimal value of p by about 0.07 on 
average, from a range of  [0.96, 1.021 to r0.93 0.961. In TMCM and in MSR, 
doubling SD(Ar) only reduces the optimal value of p by about 0.03. Evidently, 
even with relatively high interest rate volatility, a relatively large coefficient on 
the lagged funds rate is preferred in these models. 
Finally, we consider the extent to which interest rate rules with a large coef- 
ficient on the lagged funds rate stabilize the economy by generating secondary 
cycles, for example, overshooting of output. To highlight this feature, we ana- 
lyze the dynamic response of  output to an  exogenous increase in aggregate 
demand under a level rule versus a three-parameter rule with a high coefficient 
on the lagged funds rate. Each rule corresponds to the policy frontier associ- 
ated with the same level of  interest volatility as that resulting from the esti- 
mated rule in equation (1). In the FM model, we consider a 1 standard devia- 
tion shock to the IS curve. In the MSR model, autonomous demand increases 
due to 1 standard deviation shocks to consumption, fixed investment, inventory 
investment, and government spending. 
Figure 6.8 shows the stark contrast in the dynamic response of output under 
the two rules. In each model, the optimal three-parameter rule substantially 
dampens the response of output in the first few quarters compared to the opti- 
mal level rule and subsequently pushes output below potential for some time. 
Because the spending equations in both FM and MSR are forward looking, 
these expected future movements in output, prices, and short-term interest 
rates play  a role in dampening the initial impact of  the aggregate demand 
shock. Given the objective of minimizing the variance of output and inflation, 
there is a potential gain from reducing the peak response at the cost of increas- 
ing  the extent of  overshooting. In  both  models, moderate overshooting re- 
sulting from policy with large values of p is preferred to a monotone reversion 
to equilibrium values; for example, the optimal three-parameter rule reduces 
the standard deviation of output by  15 percent in FM and by nearly 40 percent 
in MSR, compared with the level rule. 
In summary, our results suggest that the forward-looking feature of  long- 
term bond rates is the principal explanation for the superior performance of 
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Fig. 6.8  Aggregate demand shocks under alternative rules 
a shock, such an “interest rate smoothing” rule typically generates a small but 
persistent movement in the short rate, which induces a large movement in the 
current long-term bond rate and thereby facilitates the stabilization of output 
and inflation. If we relax the interest rate volatility constraint or expand the set 
of  observed state variables in the policy rule, we observe small reductions in 
the optimal value of  p,  but our conclusions about the advantages of  interest 
rate smoothing are not substantially affected. Finally, we find that interest rate 
smoothing reduces the variance of output by  inducing secondary cycles, which 
reduce the initial impact of shocks due to the forward-looking nature of aggre- 
gate demand. 
6.6  Robustness to Model Uncertainty 
To evaluate the extent to which simple policy rules are robust to model un- 
certainty, we take first-difference rules from the policy frontier of one model 
and evaluate the performance of these rules in each of the other three models. 
In particular, we consider the first-difference rules A and B from the corre- 
sponding policy frontier of  the FRB model; the parameter values for these 
rules are given in table 6.3. In the FRB model, both rules generate the same 
standard deviation of the first difference of the funds rate as that generated by 
the estimated rule given in equation (1). For each of  the other models, we 
calculate the funds rate volatility associated with each of the two rules, and 
then we compute a separate policy frontier for each upper bound on funds rate 
volatility, using the class of three-parameter rules given by  equation (9). For 
example, the “rule A” policy frontier for the MSR model is the three-parameter 
policy frontier for rules with the same funds rate volatility that rule A generates 
in this model. For the Fh4  model, rules A and B produce virtually identical 
amounts of funds rate volatility. 291  Robustness of Simple Policy Rules under Model Uncertainty 
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Fig. 6.9  Performance of simple rules under model uncertainty 
The results of this analysis are depicted in figure 6.9, which shows that rules 
A and B provide reasonably efficient performance in stabilizing output and 
inflation in all four models. Conditional on the level of interest rate volatility 
implied by these rules, the coefficients of the rules are such that inflation and 
output volatility lie very near the three-parameter policy frontiers of all models. 
Evidently, in terms of efficiently reducing the volatility of output and inflation, 
well-chosen simple rules are very robust to the type of model uncertainty en- 
compassed by  these four models. Note that this comparison is constructed 
holding interest rate volatility fixed at the level generated by  rule A or B. Nev- 
ertheless, while these results show that rules A and B are reasonably efficient, 
this figure does not indicate how well the rules perform in terms of  specific 
values of  A. 
Table 6.6 reports several summary statistics about the extent to which rules 
A and B are robust to model uncertainty. The fourth column reports the value 
of  the objective function using the “true” value of  A  (assumed to be 0.25 for 
rule A and 0.75 for rule B, which are the values used to determine these rules 292  Andrew Levin, Volker Wieland, and John C. Williams 
Table 6.6  Performance of Simple Rules under Model Uncertainty 
Standard Deviations  Objective Function 
Model and Rule  Y  7l  Ar  Value  Loss  Implicit A 
FM 
A  3.78  1.85  1.97  6.15  0.86  0.1 
B  2.37  2.45  1.83  5.72  1.28  0.4 
A  0.84  0.4  0.33  0.3  0.01  0.15 
B  0.58  0.53  0.48  0.33  0  0.45 
A  2.33  1.73  1.71  3.61  0.17  0.1 
B  1.94  1.79  2  3.64  0.03  0.4 
MSR 
TMCM 
in the FRB  The fifth column reports the absolute loss in terms of the 
objective function implied by following the specified rule (A or B) instead of 
the three-parameter optimal rule (with the same amount of interest rate volatil- 
ity) for the specified value of  A. The last column reports the value of  A  that 
would be consistent with the choice of rule A or B for the particular model; for 
example, in the first row, the implicit value of A = 0.1 means that policymakers 
with preferences described by  A  = 0.1 would choose rule A in the FM model. 
These results indicate that if  a policymaker were to use the FRB model to 
choose a policy rule but the real world were actually described by  one of the 
other three models, the policy rule would generate slightly greater output vola- 
tility and slightly less inflation volatility compared with the preferences of the 
policymaker. In particular, the implicit values of  X associated with rules A and 
B are all smaller in the non-FRB models than the “true” values used in choos- 
ing rules A and B in the FRB model. However, while rules A and B are subopti- 
mal, the loss in terms of the objective function, measured either in absolute or 
percentage terms, is quite small in the MSR model and in TMCM. The some- 
what larger loss in the FM model occurs because the optimal three-parameter 
rule for that model uses a coefficient below unity on the lagged funds rate. 
Now we consider the extent to which complicated rules are robust to model 
uncertainty. In particular, we take two complicated rules (denoted by  P and Q) 
from the twelve-parameter E-frontier of  the MSR model and determine the 
performance of these rules in the FRB model and in TMCM. Because rules P 
and Q cannot be implemented directly in the FM  model (which does not ex- 
plicitly treat the components of  aggregate demand), we  also take two rules 
(denoted by  R and S) from the eight-parameter E-frontier of  the MSR model 
and evaluate the performance of these rules in the FM model. As above, the 
output and inflation variability of  the complicated rules should be compared 
25. To normalize the comparison of policy rules, these calculations assume that the value of k 
(the upper bound on funds rate volatility) for each model is given by the standard deviation of  the 
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Fig. 6.10  Two complicated rules from MSR 
with simple rules that generate the same level of interest rate volatility. Thus, 
for each model, we calculate the funds rate volatility associated with each of 
the two complicated rules, and then we compute a separate policy frontier for 
each upper bound on funds rate volatility, using the class of three-parameter 
rules given by equation (9). 
As shown in the left-hand panels of figure 6.10, the more complicated rules 
lie fairly close to the three-parameter policy frontiers of the FM  and FRB mod- 
els. In TMCM, however, the two twelve-parameter rules are much less effec- 
tive in stabilizing output and inflation than the optimal three-parameter rules. 
Thus, while small improvements in output and inflation variability may be ob- 
tained by  using complicated policy rules, these rules are somewhat less robust 
to model uncertainty compared with simple rules. As discussed in section 6.2, 
the dynamic properties of  output and inflation differ substantially across the 
four models. Thus it is not very surprising that fine-tuning a complicated rule to 
one particular model may not be appropriate when policymakers are concerned 
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6.7  Conclusions 
This paper has investigated the performance of  policy  rules across four 
structural macroeconomic models with  rational expectations. Although the 
four models differ in many important respects (e.g., the level of aggregation, 
the specification of output and price dynamics, and the treatment of the foreign 
sector), the characteristics of effective policy rules are essentially the same. To 
stabilize inflation and output at reasonably low levels of interest rate volatility, 
the policy rule should respond to the current output gap and to a smoothed 
measure of  inflation and should incorporate a high  degree of  interest rate 
smoothing, that is, a coefficient near unity on the lagged funds rate. These re- 
sults are essentially unchanged even if the policy rule is restricted to react to 
output and inflation data from the previous rather than the current quarter. 
Interest rate smoothing provides the largest gains from any of the permuta- 
tions of  simple policy rules that we have investigated. Several factors contrib- 
ute to this result: (1) Smooth changes in the short-term interest rate provide 
control over long-term interest rates and thereby over aggregate demand and 
inflation at low cost in terms of funds rate volatility. (2) Constraining interest 
rate volatility as we do in constructing the frontiers favors interest rate smooth- 
ing. (3) The lagged interest rate provides a measure of the existing state of the 
economy in models with output and inflation persistence. And (4) with a very 
high degree of  smoothing, such as that associated with first-difference rules, 
output tends to exhibit “overshooting,” which is preferable to returning mono- 
tonically to potential under the variance criterion employed here. 
Simple rules derived from one model perform very well in the other three 
models; that is, these rules are robust to model uncertainty within this class of 
models. For a given model, complicated rules perform only slightly better than 
simple ones, even when all observed state variables are incorporated in the 
rule. Furthermore, these rules are somewhat less robust to model uncertainty 
compared with well-chosen simple rules. Thus fine-tuning a complicated pol- 
icy rule to one specific model may not be advisable, because policymakers are 
faced with substantial uncertainty about the true structure of  the economy as 
well as with competing views about the quantitative effects of alternative pol- 
icy actions. 
Finally, rules that incorporate forecasts of the output gap and inflation rate 
yield at most small improvements in performance over optimal rules based on 
current and lagged variables. This result is related to that regarding compli- 
cated rules: even in large models with hundreds of state variables, three vari- 
ables (the current output gap, the current four-quarter average inflation rate, 
and the lagged funds rate) summarize nearly all the information relevant to 
setting the federal funds rate efficiently. 295  Robustness of Simple Policy Rules under Model Uncertainty 
Table 6A.1  Comparison of Foreign Monetary Policy Regimes in TMCM 
x  = 0.1  A  = 0.25  A = 0.5 
Fixed p  EMU  Fixed p  EMU  Fixed p  EMU 
SD(y,)  2.12  2.13  1.83  1.83  1.75  1.75 
SD(a,)  1.73  1.73  1.8  1.8  1.84  1.84 
01  1.17  1.16  1.4  1.4  1.46  1.46 
P  1.92  1.92  0.96  0.96  0.48  0.48 
Note: This table provides information on the U.S. inflation-output volatility frontier for interest 
rate rules of the form Ar, = ay, + p(a, -  P*),  where r, is the federal funds rate, y, is the U.S. 
output gap, and a,  -  a*  indicates the deviation of U.S. inflation from the target rate. For 0 <  A 
< 1, the policy frontier minimizes the objective function A var(y,) + (1 -  A) var(a: -  a*)  sub- 
ject to the constraint that SD(Ar,) s  2.57, where SD(z)  indicates the unconditional standard devia- 
tion of  z. Fixed p  and EMU are the two alternative foreign monetary policy regimes described in 
the appendix. 
Appendix 
U.S. Monetary Policy under Alternative 
Foreign Policy Regimes 
Our initial results indicate that within a fairly wide range of alternative foreign 
monetary policy assumptions (e.g., fixed money growth, interest rate rules), 
the specific foreign monetary policy regime appears to have only minor impli- 
cations for the properties of a U.S. monetary policy rule. For example, consider 
the class of rules in which the first difference of the federal funds rate responds 
to the current output gap and inflation deviation from target. 
Table 6A.  1 provides information about the U.S. inflation-output volatility 
frontier under  two  alternative assumptions about foreign monetary policy: 
(1) each foreign G-7 country follows a fixed money growth rule or (2) France, 
Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom belong to a monetary union in which 
the European Central Bank adjusts interest rates in response to the European 
average output gap and average inflation deviation from target, while Canada 
and  Japan independently  follow similar rules.26  Table  6A.1  shows that  in 
TMCM, neither the position of the U.S. inflation-output volatility frontier nor 
the coefficients of rules on the policy frontier are sensitive to this choice of 
foreign monetary policy assumptions. Impulse response functions generated 
using the full FRB  staff model (cf. Levin, Rogers, and Tryon 1997) yield simi- 
lar c0nc1usions.~~ 
Based on these results, the results in this paper are based on a smaller ver- 
26. Wieland (1996b) analyzes macroeconomic performance of European countries under such 
a policy regime using TMCM. 
27. Levin (1996) uses the full FRB/GLOBAL model to analyze the properties of interest rate 
rules under rational expectations  as well as under alternative assumptions concerning expecta- 
tions formation. 296  Andrew Levin, Volker Wieland, and John C. Williams 
sion of  the FRB staff model, referred  to as the FRB model. In this model, 
foreign output, prices, and the oil import price deflator are generated by simple 
reduced-form equations. The trade-weighted real exchange rate is determined 
by the differential between U.S. and foreign ex ante long-term real interest 
rates, with an  endogenous risk premium that ensures a stable ratio of net exter- 
nal debt to nominal GDP. 
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Comment  Lawrence J. Christiano and Christopher J. Gust 
General Remarks 
A key research objective in monetary economics is the identification of 
monetary policy rules with good operating characteristics. The primary strat- 
egy for achieving this objective is to construct quantitative monetary models 
and use them as laboratories for discriminating between alternative candidate 
rules.' A difficulty with this strategy is that economists have not yet converged 
on a single model. As a result, to build a case for a particular policy rule, it is 
not enough to show that it works well in just one model. After all, if the world 
is better described by  some other model, it could still be that the policy rule 
might not perform well in practice. This is why robustness is an important 
characteristic for a policy rule to satisfy. That is, it must perform well across a 
variety of empirically plausible models. 
The paper by  Levin, Wieland, and Williams is an outstanding contribution 
to this research program. It examines the performance of a class of monetary 
policy rules in four large-scale models. The performance criteria they focus on 
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1. An  alternative, complementary  strategy is implemented by  John Taylor in chap. 7 of  this 
volume. It is based on examining the historical record to see how well different policy rules have 
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include the variance of output and inflation. The class of rules considered have 
the following representation: 
(1)  r,  =  c +  pr+,  +  an, +  Py,, 
where nl is the annualized rate of inflation, rl is the annualized federal funds 
rate, and y, is the log deviation of output from trend. This policy rule is often 
referred to as a Taylor rule. The key conclusions are as follows: (1) There is 
reason to be optimistic that a suitably parameterized Taylor rule can be found 
that can serve as a useful guide to the conduct of monetary policy. (2)  Com- 
plicated rules are less robust across models than simple rules.  (3)  There are 
gains to increasing p. (4) Adding lags and other variables does not help much. 
(5)  Whether one includes nTT,, y, or  IT,_^, y,-l  in the policy rule makes little dif- 
ference. 
Of these, the first is the most important. This finding is consistent with the 
outcome of  other simulation experiments reported in this volume. Moreover, 
the conclusion also appears to be consistent with informal observations. For 
example, in chapter 7 of this volume John Taylor makes a compelling case that 
the relatively good U.S. inflation experience of the past two decades reflects 
the Fed‘s adoption of a version of equation (1) with large values of a  and p. 
The second result is also of interest. The hunch that a result like conclusion 
2 is true is an important motivation behind the current widespread interest in 
simple rules. However, we are not aware that anyone has attempted to check 
out this hunch formally before. The idea is the more complicated a rule, the 
more its parameters need to be “tuned” to the idiosyncrasies of a given model 
to make it perform well in that model. But this very tuning process may render 
the rule incompatible with the fine details of other models, giving rise to poor 
performance  in those models. Presumably, the notion that complexity is the 
enemy of robustness cannot be established as a theorem, so it is interesting to 
see how it fares in quantitative models with solid empirical foundations. The 
remaining results are interesting at a practical level. Significantly, result 3 is 
also a finding of other papers. Result 4 is consistent with the authors’ finding 
that replacing IT, by E,IT,+~  does not help much, since including E,T~+~  is implic- 
i tly a way of adding lags and other variables. Result 5 is also of importance in 
view of lags in data collection that pose practical problems for implementing 
equation (1) in real time. 
‘The Taylor Rule in a Limited Participation Model 
The Levin, Wieland, and Williams paper is sure to be an important reference 
for some time to come. The authors have put in an enormous amount of pains- 
taking, scholarly effort, with instructive results. They are to be applauded. In 
our discussion, we will assess the robustness of the authors’ findings to a fifth 
model, the one developed in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1998, here- 
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Looking at the CEE model may serve as a useful robustness check because 
it is in some respects very different from the four models considered by Levin, 
Wieland, and Williams and, indeed, from all the other models analyzed in this 
volume. For example, the CEE model does not assume that prices are sticky. 
Of  course, to get monetary policy to matter at all, some kind of  rigidity is 
needed. The rigidity we adopt is a version of the financial market friction sug- 
gested by  Lucas in his article on limited participation models. Although prices 
are not sticky by assumption in our model, they do nevertheless turn out to be 
sticky as an equilibrium phenomenon.* 
We reassess the authors’ conclusions, primarily result 1, through the lens of 
the CEE model. We  find it useful in our analysis to posit another rule as a 
benchmark for comparison. The rule that we use for this purpose is the “k 
percent rule.” This rule specifies that money growth proceeds at a constant 
pace, independent of developments in the economy. 
What sorts of pitfalls can interfere with the good performance of a monetary 
policy rule? There are at least two: 
1. The rule could itself be a source of economic instability. There are two 
possibilities: 
a) The  nonstochastic steady state equilibrium may  be  indeterminate. 
This can give rise to instability of two types: 
i)  Real quantities may  fluctuate in response to extraneous, sunspot 
ii) Real quantities may overreact to fundamental shocks. 
b)  The nonstochastic steady state may be unstable. This happens when 
there exist no equilibrium paths converging to a nonstochastic steady 
state for initial conditions arbitrarily close to steady state. 
2.  The central bank may not have the commitment technology to actually 
We  show that these two pitfalls are very real possibilities in our model econ- 
omy. Regarding the first one, we show that there are large regions of the param- 
eter space in which a monetary policy regime characterized by rule (1) makes 
the economy vulnerable to suboptimal fluctuations in real and nominal vari- 
ables. After exploring several variants of  rule (l),  we find that there is none 
that completely eliminates this risk. Still, we find that the chances are smallest 
when p and (Y are large and p is small. 
Others, including Rotemberg and Woodford in chapter 2 of this volume and 
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998), have also encountered indeterminacy and 
explosiveness working with policy rules like (  l).3  However, our results differ 
from theirs in at least two ways. First, in our model, the region of the parameter 
shocks. 
implement the policy rule in practice. 
2. This is a theme emphasized in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1997, 1998). 
3. Benhabib,  Schmitt-Grohe,  and Uribe  (1998) have  also encountered  indeterminacy  when 
working with a policy rule like rule (1). They show that it is a real possibility for the likelihood of 
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space in which indeterminacy or explosiveness occurs when the monetary au- 
thority pursues an interest rate rule like (1) appears to be larger. Second, the 
likelihood of  indeterminacy or explosiveness is increased, the more aggres- 
sively monetary  policy reacts to output, that is, the larger is p. By contrast, 
Levin, Wieland, and Williams report that they never encounter indeterminacy 
or explosiveness. Others such as Rotemberg and Woodford in this volume and 
Clarida et al. (1998)  do encounter these problems, but over a smaller region of 
the parameter space. Significantly, the likelihood of indeterminacy and explo- 
siveness problems in these models is typically reduced the larger the value of 
p. Moreover, researchers increasingly are reporting the recommendation that 
p be  set rather large. It is of interest to understand what are the key  model 
features that account for these differences in results. 
We  conjecture that the key features that differentiate  our model  from the 
others lie in  the mechanisms by which higher expected  inflation  affects the 
economy. Other models, following the IS-LM tradition, emphasize that higher 
anticipated inflation leads to a reduction in the real rate of  interest, which in 
turn results in a rise in output and actual inflation by stimulating the investment 
component of aggregate demand. It is not surprising that in these models, ag- 
gressive increases in interest rates when inflation or output rises can prevent 
higher expected inflation from being self-fulfilling. 
In our model, higher anticipated inflation induces households to substitute 
out of cash deposits in the financial sector and toward the purchase of goods. 
The resulting shortfall of cash in the financial sector puts upward pressure on 
the nominal rate of interest. If a  in the Fed's  policy rule were small, it would 
have to inject liquidity into financial markets in order to resist the rise in the 
interest rate. This expansion of liquidity would produce the increase in infla- 
tion that people anticipated. It is therefore not surprising that we obtain a result 
similar to one found for existing models: a large value of a reduces the likeli- 
hood that expectations of inflation can be self-fulfilling. However, unlike the 
existing literature, our model also suggests that a large value of p can actually 
increase the likelihood of indeterminacy. That is because the rise in the interest 
rate that occurs with a rise in inflation under the Fed's policy rule also produces 
a reduction in output. With a large p, that fall in output operates to offset the 
Fed's policy of raising the interest rate when a  >  0. In effect, raising f3 cancels 
out the indeterminacy-fighting properties of a high value of a.  Finally, a large 
value of p can be helpful in reducing the likelihood of indeterminacy by ampli- 
fying increases in the interest rate. 
The second pitfall refers to the fact there may be states of the world in which 
it  is politically infeasible to implement the policy action dictated by equation 
(I). For example, an interest rate rule that reacts aggressively to inflation could 
require raising the interest rate after a supply shock that drives up prices and 
reduces output. Raising rates at a time when output is already low might be 
viewed as producing unacceptably large social costs. That this possibility may 
be of more than academic interest is suggested by the U.S. experience in the 303  Robustness of Simple Policy Rules under Model Uncertainty 
1970s, when  there was  an  acceleration in  inflation. Statements by  Arthur 
Bums, the Federal Reserve chairman at the time, indicate that it was not out of 
ignorance about the connection between money and inflation that he failed to 
raise interest rates in the 1970s. He claimed that, instead, it was his fear of the 
social consequences of such an action that prevented him from implementing 
a high-interest-rate p01icy.~  We  display a version of  our model economy, in 
which there would be substantial pressure to deviate from a policy rule like (1) 
during a supply-shock-induced recession. The increased welfare gains from 
deviating to a k percent rule at that time are the equivalent of about 0.3 percent 
of consumption, forever. To get a sense of the magnitude of this, it corresponds 
roughly to the amount the federal government spends on the administration of 
justice, or on general science, space, and te~hnology.~  This is a substantial 
amount. These considerations make one wonder whether the Fed would have 
been able to resist the pressure to deviate from a rule like (1) and be accommo- 
dative if, instead of dropping in 1986, oil prices had risen. 
In sum, our analysis provides somewhat less cause for optimism about the 
authors’ conclusion 1. Our less optimistic view reflects differences in the mod- 
els analyzed. The authors report that in their model, they did not encounter the 
possibility of indeterminacy or explosiveness. So a final assessment of conclu- 
sion 1 hinges on which of these models is a better approximation to the data. 
We  do not have an answer to that question yet. 
The next two sections present the quantitative exercises that are the basis for 
the conclusions just summarized. 
Model 
In this section, we describe the model used in our analysis and we present 
some empirical evidence in its favor. We examine the operating characteristics 
in our model of the following three variants on rule (1): 
4. An excerpt from a speech by Arthur Bums in 1977 summarizes views that he repeated often 
during his tenure as chairman of the Federal Reserve: 
We  well know-as  do many others-that  if  the  Federal  Reserve stopped  creating  new 
money, or if this activity were slowed drastically, inflation would soon either come to an end 
or be substantially checked. Unfortunately, knowing that truth is not as helpful as one might 
suppose. The catch is that nowadays there are tremendous nonmonetary pressures in our econ- 
omy that are tending to drive costs and prices higher. .  . .  If the Federal Reserve then sought to 
create a monetary environment that seriously fell short of accommodating the nonmonetary 
pressures that have become characteristic of our times, severe stresses could be quickly pro- 
duced in our economy. The inflation rate would probably fall in the process but so, too, would 
production, jobs, and profits. The tactics and strategy of the Federal Reserve System-as  of 
any central bank-must  be attuned to these realities. 
Foradditional discussionofBums’s  (1978) speeches,  seeChari, Christiano, andEichenbaum(  1998). 
5. The preliminary estimate for 1997 of consumption of nondurable goods and services in the 
1998 Economic Report ofthe President is $4.8  trillion, so that 0.3 percent of this is $16 billion. 
The federal expenditures in fiscal year 1997 on general science, space, and technology was $17 
billion; on the administration of justice it was $20 billion. 304  Andrew Levin, Volker Wieland, and John C. Williams 
r,  =  c +  pr,+, + (1 - p)(clE,~~,+,  +  py,)  Clarida-GaH-Gertler, 
r,  =  c +  pr,+, +  (YIT,  +  py,  generalized Taylor, 
r,  =  c +  pr,+, +  a%,+,  +  py,+,  lagged Taylor. 
As before, r, is the (annualized) nominal rate of interest that extends from the 
beginning of quarter t to the end of quarter t.  Also, nZ  = log PI -  log P,- ,, ii, = 
log P, -  log PI--4,  and y, = log Y,, after a trend has been removed. We hereafter 
refer to the above as the CGG, GT, and LT  policy rules, respectively. 
We  study the performance of these three rules in the CEE model. A detailed 
discussion of the model appears in CEE, and so we describe it only very briefly 
here. Apart from two modifications, it is basically a standard limited participa- 
tion model. One modification is that in addition to having a technology shock, 
it also has a money demand shock. Traditionally, an important rationale for 
adopting an interest-rate-targeting rule was to eliminate the effects of money 
demand shocks from the real economy (see, e.g., Poole 1970). So, if anything, 
including them should bias things in favor of the interest-rate-targeting rule. A 
second difference is that although there is still a monetary authority on the 
sidelines transferring cash into and out of the financial system in our model 
economy, those transfers are endogenous when the monetary authority con- 
ducts its operations with the objective of supporting an interest-rate-targeting 
rule. 
The representative household begins period t with the economy's stock of 
money, M,, and then proceeds to divide it between Q, dollars allocated to the 
purchase of goods and M, -  Q,  dollars allocated to the financial intermediary. 
It faces the following cash constraint in the goods market: 
where I, denotes investment, C,  denotes consumption, L,  denotes hours worked, 
and W,  and PI  denote the wage rate and price level. The household owns the 
stock of capital, and it has the standard capital accumulation technology: 
K,,,  =  Z,  + (1 - O.O2)K,. 
The household's assets accumulate according to the following expression: 
where X,  is a date t monetary injection by the central bank and R, denotes the 
gross rate of return on household deposits with the financial intermediary. Also, 
D, denotes household profits, treated as lump-sum transfers, and r, is the rental 
rate on capital. An implication of this setup is that the household's date t earn- 
ings of rent on capital cannot be spent until the following period, while its date 
t wage earnings can be spent in the same period. As a result, inflation acts like 
a tax on investment. The household's date t decision about Q, must be made 305  Robustness of  Simple Policy Rules under Model Uncertainty 
before the date t realization of the shocks, while all other decisions are made 
afterward. This assumption is what guarantees that when a surprise monetary 
injection occurs, the equilibrium rate of interest falls and output and employ- 
ment rise. To  assure that these effects are persistent, we introduce an adjust- 
ment cost in changing Q,,  H, = H(Q,/Q,-,),  where H, is in units of time and H 
is an increasing function.'j  The household's problem at time zero is to choose 
contingency plans for C,,  Z,, Q,  M,+,,  L,, Kt+I,  t = 0, . . . ,  00, to maximize 
subject to the information, cash, asset accumulation, and other constraints. 
Here, 9  = 1/2.5, p = 1  .03-0.25,  and t),  is selected so that L, = 1 in nonstochas- 
tic steady state. 
Firms must finance J, of the wage bill by borrowing cash in advance from 
the financial intermediary, and 1 -  J, can be financed out of current receipts. 
The random variable, J,  is our money demand shock, and it is assumed to have 
the following distribution: 
log J,  =  0.95 logJ,-, +  E~,,  , 
where E~.,  has mean zero and standard deviation 0.01. All of the rental payments 
on capital can be financed out of current receipts. This leads to the following 
first-order conditions for labor and capital: 
where  = 1.4 is the markup of price over marginal cost, reflecting the exis- 
tence of market power. Also,L, represents the marginal product of factor i, i = 
L, K,  and 
f(K,,L,,v,)  =  exp(v,)Kp.36Lp.M, 
where 
v,  =  0.95v,+, +  E",~ 
and 
Finally, we specify monetary policy in four ways. In the first, money growth 
is purely exogenous and has the following second-order moving average form: 
has mean zero and standard deviation 0.01. 
6.  To  assure that the interest rate effect is persistent, we introduce a cost of adjusting Q,: 
H(Q,/Q,.,)  =  d(exp[c(Q,/Q,-k -  1 - x)I 
+  exp[-c(Q,/Q,.,  - 1 - x)l - 21% 
where x denotes the average rate of money growth. We set d = c = 2 and x = 0.01. 306  Andrew Levin, Volker Wieland, and John C. Williams 
x, =  x +  0.08~~  +  0.26~,+,  +  O.ll~,+~, 
where E, is a mean-zero, serially uncorrelated shock to monetary policy and 
x = 0.01. This representation is CEE’s estimate of the dynamic response of 
M1 growth to a monetary policy shock, after abstracting from the effects of all 
other shocks on monetary policy. Other representations of  monetary policy 
analyzed here include the CGG, the GT, and the LT  rules presented above. In 
these cases, the response of x, to nonmonetary shocks is endogenous, although 
we preserve the assumption throughout that Ex, = x. 
Figure 6C. 1 presents the dynamic response of the model’s variables to an E, 
shock in period 2. The percentage deviation of the stock of  money from its 
unshocked growth path is displayed in panel 6C.l~.  The magnitude of  the 
shock was chosen so that the money stock is eventually up by  1 percent. Panels 
6C.la, 6C.lb, and 6C.lf indicate that the impact effect on output of the mone- 
tary policy shock is so great that the price response is nil. Afterward, the price 
level rises slowly and does not reach its steady state position until around one 
year later. This sluggish response of the price level is what we had in mind in 
the introduction when we reported that even though we do not assume sticky 
prices, they  nevertheless exhibit stickiness as an equilibrium phenomenon. 
Next, note the hump-shaped responses of  employment, output, consumption, 
and investment. Finally, there is a persistent fall in the interest rate. As empha- 
sized in CEE, these patterns are all qualitatively consistent with the data. They 
support the notion that our model represents a useful laboratory for evaluating 
the operating characteristics of alternative monetary policy rules. 
Results 
This section presents our quantitative results. We first display the regions of 
the policy parameter space in which indeterminacy, determinacy (ie., local 
uniqueness of equilibrium), and explosiveness occur. We report that the region 
of indeterminacy and explosiveness is disconcertingly large. In the subsequent 
two sections we report some calculations to illustrate the economic meaning 
of  the indeterminacy and explosiveness findings. 
Indeterminacy, Determinacy, and Explosiveness 
Figures 6C.2, 6C.3, and 6C.4 report regions of a  and p where equilibrium 
is determinate (white), indeterminate (gray),  and explosive (black),  for p = 
0.0,0.5, and 1.5. The results are for the CGG, GT and LT  rules, respectively. 
Consider first the results for the CGG rule in figure 6C.2. When  p = 0, 
determinacy requires (Y 2  1, a result also reported in CGG. Our results resem- 
ble those of CGG in supporting the notion that an aggressive response to ex- 
pected inflation reduces the likelihood of indeterminacy. In contrast with CGG, 
however, we find that the likelihood of  indeterminacy and explosiveness in- 
crease with p. The intuition for this was discussed in the second section of 
this comment. 307  Robustness of Simple Policy Rules under Model Uncertainty 
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Fig. 6C.1  Response of model to an exogenous monetary policy shock 
Note:  % dev from SS: deviation from unshocked nonstochastic steady state growth path (percent). 
APR: annualized percentage rate. 
Now consider the results reported in figure 6C.3 for the GT rule. Chapter 7 
of  this volume, by  Taylor, suggests that a good parameterization for equation 
(1) is p = 0, a  = 1.5, and p = 1. Interestingly, figure 6C.3 indicates that for 
our model, this parameterization lies in the explosiveness region. Thus our 
model indicates that the economy would perform very poorly with this policy 
rule. According to the results in chapter 2, by Rotemberg and Woodford, when 
p = 0 and ci >  0, increasing p raises the likelihood of equilibrium determinacy. 308  Andrew Levin, Volker Wieland, and John C. Williams 
Fig. 6C.2  Regions of uniqueness, explosiveness, and indeterminacy: Clarida- 
Gali-Gertler rule 
Nore: White, uniqueness: gray, indeterminacy: black, explosiveness. 
In our model, this is not the case. Either we enter the explosiveness region for 
large p, or we enter the region of indeterminacy. Interestingly, as p increases, 
the region of determinacy expands. 
The results in figure 6C.4  for the LT  policy rule resemble those in figure 
6C.3. The preferred parameterization of  Rotemberg and Woodford, a  = 1.27, 
p = 0.08, and p = 1.13, lies in the determinacy region for our model if  we 
interpolate between the p = 0.5 and p = 1.5 graphs in figure 6C.4. A notable 
feature of  the LT  policy rule is that with  p large, the determinacy region is 
reasonably large and resembles the determinacy region for the GT rule. 
To  summarize, an aggressive response to inflation (or expected inflation) 
increases the likelihood of determinacy. However, a more aggressive response 
to output has the opposite effect in our model. In addition, our results support 
the notion that choosing a high value of  p increases the likelihood of determi- 
nacy. Finally, the CGG rule appears to have the smallest region of determinacy. 309  Robustness of Simple Policy Rules under Model Uncertainty 
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Fig. 6C.3  Regions of uniqueness, explosiveness, and indeterminacy: generalized 
Taylor rule 
Note: White, uniqueness; gray, indeterminacy; black, explosiveness. 
Illustrating Indeterminacy 
We  report some calculations to illustrate what can happen when there is 
indeterminacy. To  this end, we worked with two versions of the CGG  rule. The 
first is useful for establishing a benchmark and uses a version of the CGG  rule 
for which there is a locally unique equilibrium (p = 0.66,  p = 0.48, a  = 1.8). 
The second uses a version of  the CGG  rule for which there is equilibrium 
indeterminacy (p = 0.66,  p = 0.48,  a  = 0.95). We refer to the first rule as the 
stable CGG  rule and to the second as the unstable CGG  rule. We consider the 
dynamic response of the variables in our model economy to a 1  standard devia- 
tion innovation in J, in period 2. 
Figure 6C.5  displays the results for an economy operating under a k percent 
money growth rule (dashed line) and under the stable CGG  rule (solid line). 310  Andrew Levin, Volker Wieland, and John C. Williams 
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Fig. 6C.4  Regions of uniqueness, explosiveness, and indeterminacy: lagged 
Taylor rule 
Note: White, uniqueness; gray, indeterminacy; black, explosiveness. 
Note that under the k percent rule, the results are what one might expect from 
a positive shock to money demand: interest rates rise for a while and inflation, 
output, employment, consumption, and investment  drop. Now  consider the 
economy’s response to the money demand shock under the stable CGG rule. 
As one might expect, this monetary policy fully insulates the economy from 
the effects of the money demand shock. Panel 6C.k  indicates that this result 
is brought about by increasing the money stock. Not surprisingly, the present 
discounted utility of  agents in the economy operating under the stable CGG 
rule, 74.092, is higher than it is in the economy operating under the k percent 
rule, 74.036. These present discounted values are computed under the assump- 
tion that the money demand shock takes on its mean value in the initial period, 
and the capital stock is at its nonstochastic steady state level. 
Now consider the results in figure 6C.6, which displays the response of the 
model variables to a money demand shock in two equilibria associated with 311  Robustness of  Simple Policy Rules under Model Uncertainty 
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Note: Solid line, stable CGG rule; dashed line, k percent rule. See also note to fig. 6C.1. 
Responses to a money demand shock under two policy rules 
the unstable CGG policy rule. In equilibrium 2 (dashed line), the economy 
responds in essentially the same way that it does under the stable CGG rule. 
Now consider equilibrium 1 (solid line).  The money demand shock triggers an 
expectation of higher inflation.' Seeing the inflation coming, the central bank 
7. This illustrates the possibility mentioned in the second section of this comment that when 
there is equilibrium indeterminacy, an economy might "overreact to fundamental shocks." 312  Andrew Levin, Volker Wieland, and John C. Williams 
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Fig. 6C.6  Response to a money demand shock under unstable CGG rule 
Note: Solid line, equilibrium 1; dashed line, equilibrium 2. See also note to fig. 6C.1. 
raises interest rates immediately by  only partially  accommodating the  in- 
creased money  demand.8 In  the  following period  households, anticipating 
higher inflation, shift funds out of the financial sector and toward consumption 
(panel 6C.6b shows that Q,  rises, relative to its steady state path, in period 3). 
8. This is difficult to see in panel 6C.6~  because of scale. Money growth in period 2 is nearly 6 
percent, at an annual rate, in equilibrium 2. According to panel 6C.6g, this is enough to prevent a 
rise in the interest rate in that equilibrium. Money growth in period 2 of  equilibrium  1 is less, 
namely, 5.5 percent, at an annual rate. 313  Robustness of  Simple Policy Rules under Model Uncertainty 
The central bank responds by  only partially making up for this shortfall of 
funds available to the financial sector. This leads to a further rise in the interest 
rate and in the money supply. In this way, the money stock grows, and actual 
inflation occurs. Employment and output are reduced because of the high rate 
of interest. Investment falls a lot because the higher anticipated inflation acts 
as a tax on the return to investment. In addition, the rental rate on capital drops 
with the fall in employment. 
The utility level associated with equilibrium 1 is 73.825, and the utility level 
in equilibrium 2 is 74.110. The utility numbers convey an interesting message. 
On the one hand, if the stable CGG rule is implemented, agents enjoy higher 
utility than under the k percent rule. On the other hand, if  the unstable CGG 
policy rule is used, it is possible that utility might be less than what it would 
be under the k percent rule. In this sense, if  there were any uncertainty over 
whether a given interest rate rule might produce indeterminacy, it might be 
viewed as less risky to simply adopt the k percent rule. In a way,  this is a 
dramatic finding, since the assumption that money demand shocks are the only 
disturbances affecting the economy would normally guarantee the desirability 
of an interest rate rule like (1). 
Illustrating Explosiveness and Implementation Problems 
We  now consider a version of our model driven only by technology shocks. 
We  consider two versions of the LT  policy rule. One adopts the preferred pa- 
rameterization of  Rotemberg and Woodford: cx  = 1.27, (3  = 0.08, and  p = 
1.13. The other adopts a version of this parameterization that is very close to 
the explosive region in which p is assigned a value of unity. Figure 6C.7 re- 
ports the response of the economy to a 1 standard deviation negative shock to 
technology under two specifications of monetary policy. In one, monetary pol- 
icy is governed by  a k percent rule (dashed  line), and in the other, it is governed 
by the LT rule just described (solid line). 
Consider first the k percent rule. The technology shock drives up the price 
level, which remains high for a long period of time. Employment, investment, 
consumption, and output drop. There is essentially no impact on the rate of 
interest. The present discounted value of utility in this equilibrium is 74.095. 
Consider by  contrast the LT  rule. The rise in inflation in the first period leads 
the central bank to cut back the money supply in the following period (recall, 
this policy rule looks back one period). This triggers a substantial rise in the 
interest rate, which in turn leads to an even greater fall in employment, output, 
consumption, and investment than occurs under the k percent rule. The present 
discounted value of utility in this equilibrium is 74.036. It is not surprising that 
in this case, the k percent rule dominates the monetary policy rule in welfare 
terms, and in terms of the variability of output and inflation. 
Now  consider the operation of  the nearly explosive policy rule, in figure 
6C.8. With this rule, responses are much more persistent than under the previ- 
ous rule. The response looks very  much like a regime switch, with money 
growth and the interest rate shifting to a higher level for a long period of time. 314  Andrew Levin, Volker Wieland, and John C. Williams 
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note to fig. 6C.1. 
Given all the volatility in this equilibrium, it is not surprising that welfare is 
lower at 73.549. 
These examples illustrate the practical difficulties  that can arise in implement- 
ing an interest-smoothing rule like (1). In a recession, when output and employ- 
ment are already low, the rule may require tightening even further. The social 
cost of doing that may be such that the pressures to deviate may be irresistible. 315  Robustness of Simple Policy Rules under Model Uncertainty 
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Conclusion 
In this comment we reassessed Levin, Wieland, and Williams's findings con- 
cerning the desirability of adopting an interest rate rule of the form (1).  We did 
this using a model that is in several respects quite different from theirs. That 
model replaces the sticky price assumption used in their paper and in many of 
the papers at this conference with a particular credit market friction. Our analy- 316  Andrew Levin, Volker Wieland, and John C. Williams 
sis provides several reasons to be cautious in designing an interest rate rule. In 
this conclusion, we would like to stress two. 
First, which parameterized version of rule (1) will work well is sensitive to 
the nature of the fundamental shocks driving the economy. At the same time, 
there is little consensus on what the nature of  those shocks might be. To illus- 
trate the problem, we showed that when Rotemberg and Woodford's preferred 
rule is applied in our model and the disturbances are shocks to technology, a 
simple k percent monetary policy rule dominates their policy rule. Second, in 
our model there are large portions of the parameter space in which application 
of  an interest rate rule implies equilibrium indeterminacy or explosiveness. 
This suggests an element of risk associated with the adoption of this type of 
rule. The uncertainty we have in mind here stems from two sources. First, in 
advocating the use of  a particular rule of  the form (l),  one cannot be sure 
precisely what parameter values policymakers will use in practice. Even if one 
were confident that the rule being advocated had attractive properties, a poli- 
cymaker may implement a version with different parameter values, and which 
gives rise to indeterminacy. We  showed how, under these circumstances, a k 
percent rule might dominate an interest-rate-smoothing rule, even in the sup- 
posedly ideal case where the only shocks driving the economy are disturbances 
to money demand. Second, the region of indeterminacy for the parameters of 
a policy rule no doubt is partly a function of the underlying model parameters. 
These parameter values are not known with certainty. So, in principle, one 
might construct a set of policy rule parameter values that exhibit determinacy 
under the estimated model parameter values. But if the actual parameter values 
were different, say for sampling reasons, it could be that the constructed policy 
rule might produce indeterminacy. The analysis in this comment suggests to 
us that these sources of concern deserve further investigation. 
References 
Benhabib, Jess, Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe, and Martin Uribe.  1998. Monetary policy 
and multiple equilibria. New York: New York University. Manuscript. 
Bums, Arthur. 1978. Reflections of  an economic policy maker: Speeches and congres- 
sional statements: 1969-1978. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for 
Public Policy Research. 
Chari, V.  V., Lawrence J. Christiano, and Martin Eichenbaum. 1998. Expectation traps 
and discretion. Journal of  Economic Theory 81 (2): 462-98. 
Christiano, Lawrence J., Martin Eichenbaum, and Charles Evans. 1997. Sticky price 
and limited  participation  models: A  comparison.  European Economic  Review 41 
(6): 1201-49. 
. 1998. Modeling money. NBER Working Paper no. 6371. Cambridge, Mass.: 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Clarida, Richard, Jordi Gali, and Mark Gertler. 1998. Monetary policy rules and macro- 
economic  stability: Evidence  and some theory. NJ3ER  Working Paper no.  6442. 
Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Poole, William. 1970. Optimal choice of monetary policy instruments in a simple sto- 
chastic macro model. Quarterly Journal of  Economics 84 (May): 197-216. 317  Robustness of Simple Policy Rules under Model Uncertainty 
Discussion Summary 
Ben McCallum found the paper “just superb.” 
Mark Gertler noted an advantage of a certain type of interest rate smoothing, 
beyond the advantages mentioned in the paper. In particular, a rule that calls 
for the adjustment of the difference in the interest rate, as opposed to the level, 
does not require that the policymaker know the long-run equilibrium real rate 
of interest. With a level rule, on the other hand, stability and convergence prob- 
lems may arise if the policymaker is uncertain about the long-run equilibrium 
real rate. 
Glenn Rudebusch remarked that the point made by  William Poole during 
the discussion of the Rudebusch and Svensson paper was addressed in this pa- 
per. All the models in this paper had two interest rates, a short rate and a long 
rate linked by  a term structure. This paper does the exercise of taking out the 
long rate, which results in a lower coefficient on the lagged interest rate. 
Richard Clarida stressed that the forward-looking Taylor rule advocated in 
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998) is really a simple rule. It has the same number 
of parameters as the original Taylor rule. The inflation forecast comes from a 
projection on lagged data that, with a large number of state variables, may re- 
sult in a good approximation of the optimal rule. 
Donald Kohn was struck by the fact that what used to be a vice of monetary 
policy, moving too slowly, has turned into a virtue. The smoothness of interest 
rates reflects gradual learning about the size of  the shocks hitting the economy 
by  the monetary policy authority. This was a vice when it gave rise to the “too 
little, too late” syndrome that got built into business cycles and monetary pol- 
icy reactions. Kohn wondered if a sluggish reaction is working better here, in 
a forward-looking model, because the private sector knows what is going on 
and therefore stabilizes the economy. In the real world, this is not what hap- 
pens. Both the private sector and the policymaker learn gradually about the 
size of a shock, which could perhaps lead to instability with a slow policy re- 
action. 
Robert King applauded the narrowing of the gap between the way  models 
are built  by  academic researchers and by  the staff of  the Federal Reserve 
Board. King then asked if the MSR model could be put into the public domain. 
John Taylor added that one of his goals as editor of the conference volume was 
to ensure the replicability of the results. 
Ben McCallum questioned whether rules with a response coefficient on the 
lagged interest rate equal to one always involve slower adjustment by the Fed- 
eral Reserve than what was done historically and less fluctuations in nominal 
interest rates, in particular on the weekly or monthly level. Bob Hall mentioned 
that the appropriate definition of smoothness, going back to Christopher Sims’s 
thesis, is that the variances of interest rate changes be small. This requires both 
the random walk character and small innovations. The term “smoothness” has 
been misused somewhat at the conference. There is nothing in the Taylor rule 318  Andrew Levin, Volker Wieland, and John C. Williams 
that says it is not smooth. John Taylor suggested that more analysis should be 
done in the frequency domain, since some of the gains of interest rate smooth- 
ing could arise from volatilities  at unimportant frequencies. Lars  Svensson 
mentioned a few experiments performed in the context of his work with Rude- 
busch, not reported in the paper, on putting the variance of interest rate differ- 
ences in the loss function. The weights in the loss function on the variance of 
the interest rate and the variance of the first difference of interest rates have 
very different effects on the optimal rule. Increasing the weight on the former 
reduces the response coefficients, while increasing the weight on the latter in- 
troduces the lagged interest rate into the reaction function and increases its 
response coefficient. 
Reference 
Clarida, R., J. Gali, and M. Gertler. 1998. Monetary policy rules and macroeconomic 
stability: Evidence and some theory. NBER Working Paper no. 6442. Cambridge, 
Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research. 